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This dissertation describes vulnerability research in the area of critical infrastructure
security. The intent of this research is to develop a set of recommendations and guidelines
for improving the security of Industrial Control System (ICS) and Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition systems software. Speciﬁcally, this research focuses on the HumanMachine Interface (HMI) software that is used on control panel workstations.
This document covers a brief introduction to control systems security terminology in
order to deﬁne the research area, a hypothesis for the research, and a discussion of the
contribution that this research will provide to the ﬁeld. Previous work in the area by other
researchers is summarized, followed by a description of the vulnerability research, analysis, and creation of deliverables. Technical information on the details of a number of
vulnerabilities is presented for a number of HMI vulnerabilities, for which either the author has performed the analysis, or from public vulnerability disclosures where sufﬁcient
information about the vulnerabilities is available.

Following the body of technical vulnerability information, the common features and
characteristics of known vulnerabilities in HMI software are discussed, and that information is used to propose a taxonomy of HMI vulnerabilities. Such a taxonomy can be used to
classify HMI vulnerabilities and organize future work on identifying and mitigating such
vulnerabilities in the future.
Finally, the contributions of this work are presented, along with a summary of areas
that have been identiﬁed as interesting future work.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Critical infrastructure is a term used to deﬁne what services and processes are most
important to the functioning of an organization. On a larger scale, national critical infrastructure is made up of the services that are required to guarantee the continued operation of
a nation’s services to its citizens and defense. In 1998, United States Presidential Decision
Directive 63 (PDD-63) used the following as examples of services that are “essential to the
minimum operations of the economy and government” in the United States [40]:
• Telecommunications
• Energy
• Banking and ﬁnance
• Transportation
• Water systems
• Emergency services

PDD-63 posits a scenario where enemies of the United States (including “nations,
groups, or individuals”) would attack in non-traditional ways that target critical infrastructure. Large portions of the critical infrastructure are created and maintained by the private
sector, leaving the security of that infrastructure outside of the control of the national government. Assets owned by the private sector, only affected by the policies and compliance
1

guidelines set by the government, include telecommunications, emergency health care and
the distribution of critical goods such as food and fuel [40].
A unique problem with protecting national critical infrastructure is that the security
of portions of it may be out of the control of that nation’s government. Assets owned
by the private sector, only affected by the policies and compliance guidelines set by the
government, include health care and the distribution of critical goods such as food and
fuel.
Critical infrastructure frequently relies on automation, and that automation takes the
form of what are commonly referred to as industrial control systems (ICS) or supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA is the acronym most commonly
used to describe critical infrastructure automation in popular literature and media, however
ICS is the more general term and encompasses systems that are not normally considered
to be “supervisory”. SCADA systems typically consist of end-point units, programmable
logic controllers (PLCs) or remote terminal units (RTUs), that are responsible for monitoring and controlling systems in real-time, while parameters of that control are monitored
and modiﬁed at centralized locations. In a SCADA system implemented with true supervisory control, the temporary lack of a communications channel would result in the end-point
units continuing to operate the system normally within the parameters that were last sent
to them. ICS systems are more generally deﬁned to include systems where aspects of the
control system are directly monitored and manipulated remotely. The real-time nature of
such a system has the potential to make it more sensitive to the loss of a communications
channel.
2

Figure 1.1
HMI and RTU/PLC elements of a SCADA system.[45]

Human-machine interface (HMI) software is used to monitor, manipulate, and log data
on ICS/SCADA systems in all areas of critical infrastructure. A simpliﬁed view of the
relationship between the HMI and RTU/PLC elements of a SCADA system can be seen
in Figure 1.1.This software is typically found in control panels connected to hardware, as
well as centralized touch-screens and general purpose computers located in central monitoring and management facilities. HMI software is typically distributed as development
environments that can be used by the end-user or a solutions provider to develop a user
interface for a speciﬁc ICS/SCADA system in a similar manner as interactive development
environments (IDEs) are used to develop mainstream information technology (IT) software. This is necessary, since there is wide variation in HMI software features needed by
different elements of infrastructure, or even between two separate implementations of the
same infrastructure. The wide variety of features that HMI software implements increases
3

the attack surface that might potentially contain vulnerabilities. It is not unusual to see an
HMI system that implements everything from local user authentication and access control,
to network communications with remote PLCs, for example. Many of the ﬁle formats and
network protocols used by HMI systems are not common in mainstream IT software, so
simple parsing bugs that result in exploitable vulnerabilities are likely to be common.
Recently, there has been a documented increase in interest in control systems by attackers, including those that are involved in the national critical infrastructure. In a recent
National Cybersecurity and Communication Integration Center bulletin, the United States
Department of Homeland Security discusses the rising interest that groups such as “Anonymous” have in locating and attacking critical infrastructure control systems. A reference is
made in the bulletin to a posting by a member of Anonymous that has, on multiple occasions, posted to the Twitter social network boasting about compromising SCADA systems.
In most cases, as in the screen shot in Figure 1.2, the attacker primarily interacts with the
HMI portion of the system.
The ﬁrst control systems hacker in the United States to be convicted and serve jail time
for his SCADA hacking activity was Jesse William McGraw, a security guard at a Dallas, Texas area hospital. McGraw abused his privileged access to the building during the
night-time hours to compromise the computer system that controlled the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system of the facility. In addition to this, the system
served other critical control roles for the hospital, such as maintaining the temperature of
medicines that require specialized storage. McGraw posted screen shots of the compromised system online, boasting of his accomplishments to his hacker peers, and was in the
4

Figure 1.2
Anonymous-afﬁliated hacker boasts about SCADA HMI hacks

5

process of compromising more systems for use in a distributed denial of service (DDOS)
attack against United States government websites when he was arrested. The author of this
dissertation discovered the on-line evidence of the crime being committed, investigated,
and turned over the evidence and information gathered on McGraw to the FBI. A screen
shot of the HMI system compromised by McGraw is shown in Figure 1.3, which displays a
set of operating rooms, and controls related to ventilation in the displayed rooms. McGraw
is currently serving a sentence of over nine years in federal prison for compromising the
systems of the hospital. The law under which he was convicted has been changed since the
PDD-63 document was published, in order to impose harsher punishment on those convicted of attacking systems that are related to public health and safety, such as many parts
of our national critical infrastructure.
The widely reported-on and analyzed Stuxnet worm targeted the PLC portion of a
control system. In order to infect the PLCs with malicious code, it looked for and used
the presence of HMI software in order to bridge the gap between infecting PCs and PLCs
[39]. This illustrates that the security of HMI software is critical to the security of a control
system, and that the HMI is of high value to an attacker for gathering intelligence on the
operation of a control system, and as a vector of attack for other portions of the system.
Vulnerability analysis, in the context of software application security, is a process that
contains the following activities:
• The discovery of errors in programming or design that may constitute a security
vulnerability
• Determine exploitability
• Development of proof-of-concept exploit code
6

Figure 1.3
Screen shot of HMI compromised in attack on hospital control system.

7

• Identiﬁcation of potential mitigation and patch techniques

Vulnerability analysis, performed by malicious attackers, might give an attacker with
the intent of compromising a system to damage or proﬁt from it criminally a distinct advantage over other attackers and those responsible for defending an ICS/SCADA system.
Vulnerability analysis undertaken by security researchers, as is described in this dissertation, has the potential to dramatically improve the security of ICS/SCADA systems by
identifying weaknesses so that they may be patched or mitigated before malicious actors
can exploit them. It is unknown how many vulnerabilities in ICS/SCADA HMI systems
are known by attackers that are not known by the public, HMI vendors, or national critical
infrastructure stakeholders. It is the goal of this research to take the beneﬁts of vulnerability analysis a step further, and use the results to inform the development of more secure
systems in the near future.

1.1

Hypothesis
It is hypothesized that building a taxonomy of vulnerabilities through case studies of

discovering, analyzing, and exploiting previously unpublished HMI vulnerabilities, alongside existing vulnerability information available in the public domain, is possible and can
serve as a set of guidelines for implementing sound basic security principles in control
systems software in the future. Due to the unique set of tasks that HMI systems must handle, and the relative lack of consideration given to security in the design and architecture of
HMI systems, many vulnerabilities will be the result of similar mistakes being made during
the development process. A taxonomy of HMI vulnerabilities, with well-documented case
8

studies, would allow for a set of practical and actionable recommendations to be made to
HMI developers to prevent the same vulnerabilities from showing up in future HMI products. The same documentation would also provide vulnerability analysts a starting point
for identifying potential vulnerabilities in existing HMI software.
If the vulnerabilities discovered through the process of compiling the case study have
commonalities, such as speciﬁc security principles that they routinely violate, or design
and implementation errors that are common across multiple products, then this would indicate that there is a lack of appropriate documentation and training on security available
to the developers of many, if not most, HMI products. If the new vulnerabilities documented in this case study show common features with the body of existing and published
HMI vulnerabilities, then this would strongly indicate that a common set of design and
implementation ﬂaws are responsible for weaknesses in national critical infrastructure.

1.2

Contribution
This dissertation, as a collection of recommendations and guidelines backed by exam-

ples and case-studies of actual HMI vulnerabilities, will serve as a resource for ICS/SCADA
software developers, maintainers, stakeholders, and solutions providers. This resource will
allow them to more easily take advantage of mainstream IT security research in improving
the security of their own products and systems by identifying what is unique and important
to the security of HMI software. This will be a signiﬁcant step forward for practitioners in
the area of HMI software security, who serve as one the most important lines of defense
for the national critical infrastructure.
9

In addition to this primary goal, this research will serve as a useful resource for vulnerability researchers and “red team” penetration testers that are tasked with identifying new
vulnerabilities in the development and deployment of HMI systems. While the developers mentioned in the earlier this dissertation have experience in the ICS/SCADA ﬁeld and
would beneﬁt from the security testing aspects of the document, vulnerability researchers
and penetration testers are familiar with the security aspects, and would beneﬁt from the
ICS/SCADA-speciﬁc material. By providing information on common vulnerabilities in
HMI software, the time a “red team” would need to familiarize themselves with a SCADA
target would be reduced, allowing them to be more efﬁcient and effective in their testing.
Overall, this would result in better security recommendations for improving the security of
individual elements of national critical infrastructure.
This research may also form the basis for future research in generating recommendations for specialized areas of software development that have not traditionally seen much
attention from vulnerability analysts. By following a similar pattern of vulnerability analysis and comparing the results for a set of software products in the same specialized area,
researchers may be able to develop similar recommendations that are suited for those speciﬁc areas of software development. This dissertation may have some positive impact on
the development and testing of secure software systems in other specialized areas.
An immediate beneﬁt of the research will be the responsible disclosure of a set of
vulnerabilities in HMI products. Disclosures will allow the vendors to patch existing HMI
products, or at the very least publish mitigation strategies. End-users of the HMI products,
including organizations responsible for national critical infrastructure, can implement these
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patches and mitigation strategies to improve the security of their ICS/SCADA systems.
Publicly disclosed vulnerability information removes the power that criminal or malicious
attackers may have in the same vulnerabilities that they have discovered, but not disclosed,
for their own beneﬁt.
By disclosing not only the details of the vulnerabilities and exploits, but also the vulnerability discovery processes and actions that led to discovery of the vulnerabilities, vulnerability analysts may beneﬁt directly from this research. Vulnerability analysts that are
tasked with ﬁnding vulnerabilities in other HMI products would beneﬁt from being able
to start their work from techniques presented in case-studies. Information security students would also beneﬁt from having a start-to-ﬁnish example of how real-world security
problems are identiﬁed, analyzed, and exploited.
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CHAPTER 2
PREVIOUS WORK

Advances in vulnerability analysis have largely been driven by the private sector information security industry, due in parts to the monetary value of vulnerability information
to businesses such as intrusion detection system signature providers and penetration testing ﬁrms. While the origins of some vulnerability analysis techniques such as “fuzzing”
(a form of fault-injection that involves automated generation of inputs that may highlight
security weaknesses) have their simplest roots in academia [30], it is typically the private
sector that develops vulnerability analysis techniques into mature tools such as the ones
that are used in this research for vulnerability analysis [38]. In the case of exploit development, many techniques have their roots in more “underground” publications, as is
the case with the most common form of memory corruption exploitation: stack overﬂows
[1]. One goal for the deliverable guidelines and recommendations in this research is to
describe the vulnerability discovery process, vulnerability information, and exploitation in
enough detail to provide useful insight to ICS/SCADA developers, and to provide better
documentation to “red team” vulnerability analysts tasked with ﬁnding vulnerabilities in
similar systems.
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One of the threats that SCADA systems are most vulnerable to is the threat of malicious
insiders. Insider threats are deﬁned as being users that have elevated their privileges above
and beyond what they are allowed by an organization’s security policy, and outside of the
scope of what they need to fulﬁll their duty in the organization. Insider attackers have
unique opportunities when compromising systems [4]. For SCADA systems, one huge
advantage that an insider has is physical access to the hardware and the software that runs
on it. Given this level of access, it far more difﬁcult to prevent escalation of privilege.

2.1

Vulnerability Taxonomy
Hansen et al [16] describes a taxonomy of vulnerabilities in implantable medical de-

vices that categorizes vulnerabilities in terms of the proximity needed to exploit the vulnerability, the activity that is required for exploitation, the required state of the patient,
components affected, and how permanent the damage is. SCADA systems share many
traits of medical systems (and on a larger scale, medical systems may be implemented
as SCADA) such as having software control physical processes, and the critical nature of
its operation. The traits described in Hansen’s taxonomy may be adaptable to a SCADA
HMI classiﬁcation, especially considering that proximity (local, remote, level of hardware
access) is a factor in many SCADA vulnerabilities.
Yan and Randall [47] presented a vulnerability taxonomy to describe cheating in online gaming that involves classiﬁcation of features along a two-dimensional grid, with one
axis describing the method by which a compromise was made and the other axis describing
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traits of each vulnerability including these that may have application to SCADA HMI
vulnerabilities:
• Design issues of the game system and underlying system
• Human error on the part of the game operator or player
• Integrity violation
• Denial of service
• Theft of information or possession
• Masquerading
From current work in HMI vulnerability analysis, it is obvious that a large portion of
the vulnerabilities involve the amount of trust placed in client software to authenticate and
authorize the end user and his or her actions. This is very similar to the challenges that online games face in loading bounds-checking and security code into the client, versus the
server. In gaming, this is a trade-off of performance, latency, and security. In SCADA HMI
systems, the architecture and design of the system may dictate where security features are
implemented.
Briesemeister et al, in their description of a project for detecting, correlating and visualizing threats against critical infrastructure [5], describe the use of “event classes” in
their system to help classify control system incidents across multiple sensors. Incidents
are given a set of classes, where the most serious incidents involve denial of service or
distress to the assets of a control system, and less severe incidents involve probes of the
system and suspicious usage. Assets also contribute to the measure of criticality of an incident, where RTU/PLC incidents are given a much higher criticality than HMI incidents.
While this is a categorization of incident types, and the relative criticality of one portion of
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the system or another may not be accurate in all cases, the terminology and divisions used
may be useful in describing a taxonomy of HMI vulnerabilities.

2.2

Information Security Metrics
A vulnerability taxonomy for HMI vulnerabilities is one step in improving the ability

to measure the security of a critical infrastructure control system as a whole. Information
security metrics can be deﬁned as a set of criteria for measuring the effectiveness of information security implementations. NIST, in their “Performance Measurement Guide for
Information Security” [8], which supersedes a document entitled “Security Metrics Guide
for Information Technology Systems”, deﬁnes a metric or measurement as being the “results of data collection, analysis, and reporting”. Among other measures, NIST describes
measures of effectiveness and efﬁciency, which are used to determine if security controls
are correctly implemented. In the area of HMI security, a taxonomy of vulnerabilities could
be used to evaluate an HMI product in order to determine the effectiveness and efﬁciency
of its controls.
Vaughn, Henning, and Siraj [43] propose a taxonomy of metrics that include types
that are described by a set of categories, each of which can be classiﬁed in two states.
These categories include objective/subjective, quantitative/qualitative, static/dynamic, absolute/relative, and direct/indirect. When using vulnerability information to measure HMI
security, the metric may become more objective than subjective, due to there being a base
set of common ﬂaws that can be tested against. Also, the security of an HMI product may
be more directly observed, given a taxonomy of common ﬂaws. HMI security would be
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considered relative, as measuring the security of an HMI product does not take into account the mitigating controls surrounding it, and dynamic, as the product conﬁguration,
and known vulnerabilities, both may change over time. Metrics for technical objects are
also presented, where a set of common HMI vulnerabilities may be useful in measuring
the adversarial work factor needed to compromise the system, and the strength of the security of the products and implementation in general. A set of known vulnerabilities in a
speciﬁc product can be used to measure the weakness that product has in an organization’s
environment, which would inform the decision of what security and mitigation techniques
need to be layered around the product, such as ﬁrewalls, VPNs, and intrusion detection.

2.3

Vulnerability Analysis Tools
The following types of existing vulnerability analysis tools will be utilized heavily

in the vulnerability discovery process. For each, a speciﬁc tool is named, as well as the
purpose for each in the process of this research:
• System tracing/logging utilities - Used to locate important ﬁles and registry entries
that products might be using to implement security features. The Sysinternals Suite
contains a wide variety of these tools [29].
• Network monitoring software - Used to identify network trafﬁc being generated and
accepted by the products being tested. Necessary for reverse engineering network
protocols. Wireshark is the primary monitoring tool that will be used [23].
• Debuggers - Used to trace through program execution to determine how security
features are implemented, and to assist in the exploit development process. Immunity
Debugger will be used for most of this testing [36].
• Disassemblers - Used to reverse engineer and understand the implementation of compiled binary software. IDA Pro provides the best graphing capabilities of any current
disassembler [12].
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• Fuzzing Tools - Used to generate random and mutated inputs for a program automatically, in order to expose network protocol and parsing ﬂaws. SPIKE is a common
fuzzer, however in this research it is likely that a variety of others will be used [38].
• Scripting tools - Used to develop exploits and ad-hoc tools for situations that existing
vulnerability analysis tools do not adequately cover. Python and Ruby (as part of the
Metasploit Framework) will be used for this purpose [36].

Fuzz testing, compared with the other tools and techniques in the above list, require
much more involved techniques and processes for the vulnerability analyst. The earliest
example of fuzz testing in academic literature was inspired by a program crashing after line
noise over a modem connection introduced by a lightning strike caused a Unix program
to crash attempting to parse the spurious input. This led to the development of a suite
of utilities meant to test the error handling capabilities of command-line programs. These
programs provided random input to the target software, monitored the software for crashes,
and then logged the string combinations that cause the software to fail. Afterwards, the
strings that caused crashes were analyzed alongside the code for the software in order
to determine what had caused the crash [30]. Beyond the normal desire for reliability
in software, crashes of this nature often indicate the presence of bugs that represent a
security risk. By examining the cause of the crash, a vulnerability analyst may be able
to control the execution path of the software, and create an exploit that allows for remote
access, or escalation of privilege. Similar techniques are used today by many vulnerability
analysts to discover the location of vulnerabilities in software where source code is not
openly available. For closed-source software, this technique has the beneﬁt of revealing
the locations of potential vulnerabilities without prior knowledge of the internals of the
software [38].
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2.4

Applying Vulnerability Analysis to SCADA
Fernandez and Larrondo-Petrie have presented work on applying commonly accepted

security patterns, or best practices, to the development of SCADA systems [13]. The focus
of the work has been on vulnerabilities associated with communications between various
aspects of a SCADA network, with much less focus on vulnerabilities and security features
in the HMI components. Rather than focusing on the entire SCADA system, this work
focuses on the secure development of the HMI, which has its own unique functionality
within a SCADA network, and its own set of common vulnerabilities. For example, clientside ﬁle format attacks are much more feasible for attackers to perform successfully against
HMI systems than other elements of a SCADA system.
Cagalaban and Kim have presented work on improving SCADA security through vulnerability analysis [7]. In this case, however, the term “vulnerability analysis” is used to
describe a scoring system for rating the risk of a vulnerability, rather than the vulnerability
discovery, examination, and exploitation process. This research focused on fault-injection,
comparable to the fuzzing techniques used to discover vulnerabilities in mainstream IT
software. This work focuses on the protocols involved in SCADA communications, rather
than on the HMI.

2.5

SCADA Intrusion Detection
Many current efforts in SCADA intrusion detection focus on detecting attempt to ex-

ploit portions of a control system that involve protocols unique to SCADA, such as ModBus and DNP3. Shosha et al [37] describe a distributed intrusion detection system (DIDS)
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approach to detect attacks on SCADA networks. A DIDS would be able to use sensors
in multiple locations in the control system network to detect anomalous behavior such as
man-in-the-middle attacks on the DNP3 protocol. Other approaches, such as Barbosa and
Pras’ [2] involve taking advantage of features of control system networks that limit the
range of various activity that take place when compared to traditional IT networks. By
assuming that SCADA networks have a relatively ﬁxed number of devices, small number
of protocols in use per network, and regular patterns of communication deﬁned by the programming of the PLCs and HMIs, anomalies that step outside of those boundaries become
easier to detect.
One beneﬁt of HMI vulnerability analysis, and building a taxonomy of HMI vulnerabilities, is that a large portion of the vulnerabilities involved are exploitable over conventional
IT networks and protocols, such as web or remote desktop trafﬁc implemented on top of a
TCP/IP network, or locally as a form of privilege escalation on the host machine running
the HMI. By increasing the body of knowledge surrounding these HMI vulnerabilities, signatures can be written that more generally detect the kinds of attacks that are commonly
successful against these systems. This would give conventional IT intrusion detection and
host protection products the ability to detect and react to many intrusions of HMI systems.

2.6

HMI Vulnerability Analysis
While HMI products have not seen the same vulnerability analysis attention as main-

stream IT software, some vulnerabilities have been discovered and disclosed. One of the
most popular HMI products, Wonderware, has had memory corruption vulnerabilities dis19

covered and disclosed, which would open up the possibilities for attackers to run arbitrary,
malicious code. In 2008, Core Security disclosed a vulnerability in Wonderware’s SuiteLink service, which allows for communications between elements of a Wonderware system. This vulnerability would allow remote, un-authorized attackers to crash and possibly
assume control over Wonderware systems. A mishandling of a large length ﬁeld in the
SuiteLink protocol is responsible for the vulnerability [10]. While the Core Security advisory does not elaborate on how the vulnerability was found, a protocol fuzzing process
would likely be able to ﬁnd the same vulnerability. It is common for vulnerability advisories to not include the processes used to discover the vulnerabilities in question, and it is
not always immediately obvious from the vulnerability itself. Case-study documentation
of these processes may be a useful contribution of this dissertation research.
Siemans’ WinCC has also had a memory corruption vulnerability discovered and disclosed, in June/July 2011. The advisory for this vulnerability indicates that it is a ﬁle
parsing bug that is responsible. With this kind of vulnerability, attackers would be able to,
with minimal user interaction, assume control of HMI systems [19].
Luigi Auriemma has publicly disclosed many advisories on SCADA and HMI systems
over the past few years [24]. Some of these vulnerabilities are trivial to exploit, including
a recent one disclosed in the SpecView HMI software, where a directory traversal bug in a
web server allows an attacker to access any ﬁle on the server that is hosting the software. In
the Pro-face Pro-Server EX software, Luigi discloses memory leak and corruption vulnerabilities, in addition to the trivial encoding of the password (exclusive-or against a static
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key). These vulnerabilities echo characteristics of vulnerabilities found by the author in
other HMI packages.
GLEG Ltd. has a collection of what it advertises as a pack of all publicly available
SCADA exploits as a pack of exploits for the Immunity Canvas framework. While the exploit pack is a paid product, the list of updates provides insight into the types of vulnerabilities included, many of which revolve around password disclosure, information disclosure,
and improper access control [15]. Many of the included exploits are based off of vulnerability information that Luigi has released, alongside several “zero day” vulnerabilities
(despite the “public” advertised nature of the package). For this research the vulnerability
information, coupled with the product names, can serve as a good source of products to
include in case studies.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION PLAN

This chapter summarizes the plan for this research and experimentation, including discussion of the case study format and research questions.

3.1

Overview
As a research project directly involving case studies, Zainal recommends a set of steps

that are involved in the process [48] and are adapted here for the purpose of a software
vulnerability case study:
• Deﬁning research questions
• Case selection
• Data collection
• Data analysis
• Reporting

3.2 Research Questions
In this dissertation research, analysis of the case studies should provide answer to the
following questions:
• Do many HMI products have ﬂaws in the implementation of security features?
• Are these ﬂaws exploitable by attackers?
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• Are there similarities to the ﬂaws in HMI products from different vendors?
• Based on these similarities, can HMI vulnerabilities be classiﬁed into a taxonomy?
• From this taxonomy, can a set of recommendations be made of secure development
practices that would prevent future products from having the same types of vulnerabilities?

3.3

Case Selection
Several ICS/SCADA Human-Machine Interface products were be selected for this re-

search. Criteria for selection included popularity of the product, as determined by search
engine ranking, level of discussion on public forums, and the presence of critical infrastructure clients in advertising. Other criteria included the level of discussion or interest in
the HMI product on “hacking” forums that have been identiﬁed to discuss ICS/SCADA
security, the functionality of the HMI product’s demonstration or development copy, and
the immediately obvious attack surface that is exposed. Using this process to select HMI
products resulted in case studies and examples that practitioners in the ﬁeld will ﬁnd familiar, and will also have a higher immediate impact on the security of HMI products that
are in wide use. Products that have multiple interfaces, such as a captive local GUI and an
external web interface, were among those chosen.

3.4

Data collection
The processes described in this section were used to examine the HMI software in each

case of the study, in order to locate vulnerabilities in the software, analyze the vulnerabilities, and gather the information needed to answer the research questions.
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3.4.1

Vulnerability Discovery and Analysis

For each product, vulnerability analysis was undertaken to determine a set of possible
security ﬂaws. For each of these ﬂaws, the other selected HMI products were analyzed for
similar vulnerabilities. By using the results of vulnerability analysis for one HMI product
to inform the analysis of the other selected products, vulnerabilities that are inherent to the
design or development techniques being used by HMI developers were identiﬁed.

3.4.2

Attack Surface

The ﬁrst step in vulnerability analysis of each product was to determine the attack
surface available. This determination was made for both the external attack surface made
available to remote attackers in the form of network services (such as web-based interfaces and ICS/SCADA protocols), as well as local interfaces that may give attackers the
opportunity to escalate privileges. By determining the available attack surface of the product upfront, the rest of the vulnerability analysis process was tailored for that particular
product, while maintaining some consistency across products.

3.4.3

Security Feature Targeting

For each product, an element of the vulnerability analysis involved identifying all
of the “advertised” security features that are presented in the documentation and sales
materials for the product. These are features that an end user of the product can reasonably
assume to either protect them from compromise or maintain appropriate privileges for each
class of user on the system. For each of these features, the implementation was examined
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to determine if it has been implemented with regard to current best practices in secure
development, and to determine if there are any ﬂaws in the implementation that can be
exploited to circumvent the security control or otherwise take control of the product.

3.4.4

File Format Vulnerabilities

Potential ﬁle-format parsing vulnerabilities were explored in each product as well.
A potentially serious attack vector for HMI products may be to compromise solutions
provider machines by setting out “bait” on the public Internet in the form of graphical or
code resource ﬁles that developers at solutions providers can use in HMI products to more
efﬁciently create solutions for their clients. A ﬁle-format vulnerability in an HMI product
can create a back door into the system once a specially crafted ﬁle is loaded up into the
development or deployed interfaces in the HMI product. These vulnerabilities may be
identiﬁed either by identifying publicly available libraries being used in HMI products that
are known to contain vulnerabilities, or by using “fuzzing” techniques to craft ﬁles that
might expose potential vulnerabilities on an automated basis.

3.4.5

Network Protocol Fuzzing

Potential remote exploitation vulnerabilities were explored by manipulating the protocols that are exposed by the HMI products. Common attacks were tested, such as directory
traversal and cross-site request forgery attacks against web servers, to see if they can be
used to remotely assume control or in some other way disrupt or inﬂuence the operation of
the HMI. Protocol fuzzing techniques were to attempt to identify problems that were more
speciﬁc to the individual products.
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3.4.6

Exploit Development

For each potential vulnerability found, attempts were made at developing exploits that,
at the very least, prove the concept of the vulnerability. Vulnerabilities that are known to
be exploitable are typically considered by vendors and end-users to be more serious, which
accelerates the development of patching and mitigation. Exploit information for vulnerabilities is also extremely useful to other vulnerability analysts and “red team” penetration
testers that are tasked with testing ICS/SCADA systems. Some exploits were developed
into more mature attacks that demonstrate the capabilities an attacker may have when facing an ICS/SCADA system, to illustrate the need for more secure development practices
for HMI.

3.4.7

Pilot Study

A pilot study was conducted with the GE Fanuc iFix 4.5 HMI product [27]. In this
study, it was observed that a feasible attack surface was identiﬁable and included both
local and network authentication. By targeting the advertised functionality for authentication, access control, and secure storage, a suite of vulnerabilities were found that were the
result of a software architecture that had evolved over time without sound security principles being given due attention. Network protocol issues were found and exploits were
successfully developed for all of the identiﬁed vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities that were
identiﬁed were design and architecture issues, rather than programming errors, which may
indicate that other similar products of similar functionality may have the same kinds of
vulnerabilities.
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3.5

Data Analysis
Each vulnerability in each product was documented, including characteristics that de-

ﬁne the type of the vulnerability, protocols or ﬁle formats involved, and how it can be exploited. Across the set of HMI products, these vulnerabilities were compared to determine
what similarities there are in the types of vulnerabilities that are found in HMI products.
Where possible, the architecture and design elements of the products that were responsible
for the vulnerabilities were examined, to identify places where many products make the
same mistakes. The information gathered from examining and comparing vulnerability
information were then be developed into a set of recommendations and best practices that
can be used by HMI vendors to develop more secure HMI products in the future. Recommendations were also made on mitigation strategies that end-user stakeholders can use to
protect their existing HMI product deployments.

3.6

Reporting
The recommendations and best practices were organized into taxonomies of vulner-

ability types or classes, with overview material that is generic to the type or class, and
technical walk-throughs of each vulnerability. This technical description contains aspects
of how the vulnerability was discovered and how it can be exploited (if exploitation is feasible). Mitigation strategies and alternative designs are presented that might have prevented
the vulnerability, or reduce the impact of a malicious attack.
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CHAPTER 4
VULNERABILITY CASE STUDIES

This chapter documents the case studies of vulnerabilities used in this research to identify common characteristics and develop a taxonomy of control systems human machine
interface software vulnerabilities.

4.1

GE Fanuc iFIX
iFIX is a popular HMI package from General Electric’s Intelligent Platforms division

that provides both a development and runtime environment for graphically manipulating
SCADA systems. The software attempts to provide security with a system for authenticating and separating privileges for a number of users[14]. The current version of iFIX, at the
time of writing, is version 5.5. The vulnerabilities described here and in prior publications
by the author were discovered in version 4.5 [27].

4.1.1

Password Disclosure

It is generally accepted by practitioners in the ﬁeld of information security that passwords should only be stored persistently as the result of hashing the plain-text password
and a per-user unique “salt” value with a cryptographic hashing algorithm. Hashing algorithms, such as SHA-1, are one-way functions that produce a unique and ﬁxed-length
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output for any input of any size. The input of a cryptographically secure hashing algorithm
should not be reversible from its output in a reasonable amount of time, nor should it be
possible to ﬁnd a “collision” (two inputs that result in the same output) in a reasonable
amount of time. These properties of cryptographic hashing algorithms can be used to securely store passwords in a way that allows users to be authenticated easily, and, at the
same time, prevent attackers from being able to recover plain-text passwords easily when
the password storage is compromised. The result of hashing the password and salt value
is stored alongside each user’s identiﬁcation, and each time the user logs in, the provided
password is hashed and compared with the hash stored with the user’s identiﬁcation.
A common mistake made by developers implementing their own authentication schemes
is to store passwords in plain-text, or using an encryption scheme that does not involve
cryptographic hashing. Such schemes function as authentication normally, however in
the event that the password storage is compromised (either via a compromised “admin”
account, or through some other failure to protect that area of the system), these implementations fail in a much less safe fashion than a system using cryptographic hashing. If
a system only stores securely hashed representations of the password, the password ﬁle
or database is of little use to an attacker unless considerable resources are put towards
attempting to “crack” the hashes by comparing them to the hashes an attacker generates
off of commonly used passwords and derivations. A password traditionally accepted to
be strong (10+ mixed-case, alphanumeric and symbol characters) hashed, along with a
salt value, with a cryptographically strong algorithm will resist this kind of attack for an
amount of time and computing resource that an attacker would ﬁnd prohibitive.
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In the case that passwords are stored in plain-text, the attacker instantly has every plaintext password for every user once he or she compromises the password storage. This is
valuable for an attacker, even if authentication has been compromised in some other way,
as password re-use by users may give the attacker a foothold as a user in a more secure
system for which that they previously had no access. In cases where the password ﬁle, or
individual passwords are encrypted, the attacker simply has to derive the key or mechanism
by which the authentication system decrypts the passwords in order to check for authorization. Unlike cryptographic hashing, which has no requirement for stored plain-text or key,
any form of encryption must involve stored secrets that the authentication system must use
to perform authentication. If the attacker has access to this information as well, then passwords can be trivially recovered using the same process as the legitimate authentication.
This is classiﬁed as a design ﬂaw, and can be easily corrected by utilizing standard
hashing algorithms which are frequently available in libraries commonly found installed by
default on modern operating systems. At some point before programming such a system,
the design decision of password storage needs to be addressed to the extent of determining
how passwords are to be salted, hashed, stored, and retrieved for authentication. Failing to
do this can result in a system being implemented that works under normal circumstances,
but provides much less security than would be desirable.
iFIX, in vulnerable versions, did not follow best practices in storing passwords. By
monitoring ﬁle-system activity of the iFIX installation during the process of adding, removing, and changing the password of users to known values, it was determined that a
ﬁle in the “/LOCAL/” subdirectory of the iFIX system contained a ﬁle named “XTCOM30

PAT.UTL” that was being used to store user credentials. The same ﬁle was accessed when
users were authenticated and allowed to log into the iFIX system.
Under initial examination, it was obvious that “XTCOMPAT.UTL” did not contain
ASCII or Unicode plain-text of the supplied passwords, indicating that the information
was potentially encrypted or hashed. Upon further examination, however, it was observed
that a change to a single character of the supplied password would result in only a singlebyte change in the password ﬁle. This was immediately seen as a sign that the credentials
were not stored securely. If a cryptographic hash was being used, each bit of the output
hash would have a equal and random chance of matching the hash for a different password
with even a single bit difference from the original. In other words, a single bit or byte
change in the password should result in a completely different hash.
With each character position of the password being tied to a byte of the password
storage, it was hypothesized that the user’s password was being bit-wise exclusive-or’d
with a key value before being written to password storage. While a correctly-implemented
exclusive-or encryption scheme can provide perfect communications security (any possible
plain-text being equally likely to correspond to a given cipher-text), it becomes trivial to
break in cases where the key is shorter than the length of the plain-text (and thus repeats),
where keys are re-used, or when the key cannot be stored or distributed securely. In situations where passwords need to be authenticated automatically, the key for an exclusive-orbased system must necessarily be stored somewhere, providing for less-than-ideal security.
To test this hypothesis, the location in the “XTCOMPAT.UTL” ﬁle for a user was determined by setting a variety of maximum-length passwords and observing the changed
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bytes. Then, a known password of maximum length (twenty “a”s in a row) was chosen for
a user, and the resulting “encrypted” password in the ﬁle was observed. Finally, by taking
advantage of the fact that exclusive-or is both commutative and associative, the key was
derived by performing a bitwise exclusive-or of the known password and the on-disk representation. The resulting key was subsequently tested by using it to successfully decode
the stored password, even after changes were made, and for other users and installations of
iFIX.
Similar testing was used to extract the keys being used for other ﬁelds in the user data
structures stored in “XTCOMPAT.UTL”. User records in this ﬁle can be decoded using the
following keys:
• Offset: 0x04 bytes
• Length: 20 bytes
• XOR Key: 143A5B2BC39CF4B9019B40DE088B8BE8BAB4ED67
• Offset: 0x24 bytes
• Length: 20 bytes
• XOR Key: F84C300234F87780A890A22DCCD02C30621CF857
• Offset: 0x3A bytes
• Length: 6 bytes
• XOR Key: 9FE70758B8FD

When exploited with with a small program written to parse “XTCOMPAT.UTL”, this
ﬂaw allows an attacker to have immediate access to all of the user names and passwords for
an iFIX installation if the contents of the “XTCOMPAT.UTL” are available to the attacker.
Architectural and design problems with iFIX discussed in subsequent sections contribute to
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the ready disclosure of this ﬁle to attackers. An attacker who has access to an iFIX system
in-person, over a compromised remote desktop, or authenticating over a local network
is likely able to exploit this vulnerability. The impact of this vulnerability goes beyond
access to the iFIX interface if passwords are re-used in other elements of the organization’s
network.
This vulnerability directly violates the principle of “open design” as described by
Saltzer & Schroeder [33]. This principle states that the security of a mechanism should
not depend on the ignorance of the process by attackers. As applied to a password authentication system, a system that follows this principle would not rely on a “secret” key that
cannot be easily be protected.
HMI developers can avoid similar ﬂaws in the design phase by using best-practices
for hashing passwords with well-known and accepted cryptographic hashing algorithms
designed for the purpose, or by taking advantage of modern operating systems built-in
capabilities for identifying, authenticating, and providing separation between users. If at
any time the development team ﬁnds themselves hard-coding a “secret” key in the application that is used to protect data from being disclosed, there should be a review of the
design of that particular subsystem in order to determine a more accepted and secure way
to implement the same functionality.
SCADA stakeholders can mitigate this vulnerability by more carefully controlling access to systems that use the iFIX HMI. A key aspect of this vulnerability is that it effectively
“ﬂattens” the different levels of access that iFIX allows for different classes of users. If
an iFIX installation prevents, for example, a control panel operator from making changes
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to the interface, programming, or conﬁguration of an iFIX project that an engineering role
would be allowed to make, then this vulnerability can be used to escalate privileges from
the lower level to the higher with relative ease. Unmonitored access should not be granted
to those not cleared for operating the system at the highest level of privilege. Passwords
should not be re-used for accounts on iFIX and non-iFIX systems, to limit the impact
of a compromise. The iFIX system can be conﬁgured to use Windows API functionality to authenticate users via the operating system. While this conﬁguration can be used
to make password storage more secure, other vulnerabilities discovered and described in
subsequent sections render this mechanism insufﬁcient, by itself, for restricting access.

4.1.2

Intercepting Network Authentication

Communications security is important when authenticating over a network, to prevent
attackers from intercepting users’ credentials or replaying trafﬁc in order to authenticate.
It is generally recognized that some form of encryption is needed to ensure that, even in
the case where an attacker is able to intercept and manipulate data in the authentication
process, that the attacker would be unable to derive usable credentials or hijack the process
in order to authenticate him or herself. Authentication should fail closed, in that modiﬁcations made to trafﬁc should, at best for the attacker, only cause the authentication to fail
for that attempt, rather than give access to anyone other than authorized users.
A classic example is the improvement in security provided by using the secure shell
(SSH) protocol for shell access to remote systems over the unencrypted alternative, Telnet. An attacker with the ability to sniff network trafﬁc between a client and server, either
34

passively or through active means (such as ARP-spooﬁng), can easily intercept users authenticating via Telnet. SSH utilizes public-key cryptography in order to establish the
identity of the host to the client, allowing the two to exchange a session key that can be
used to securely encrypt authentication and subsequent access. A passively monitoring attacker would not be able to decrypt the trafﬁc without private keys that are not transmitted,
and would not be able to inject anything that would be interpreted as valid authentication.
iFIX, in vulnerable versions, provided functionality for authenticating over a network
in cases where many computers are required to share the same set of users. There is,
however a ﬂaw in the way that iFIX performed this authentication. As a result, attackers
can retrieve the entirety of the “XTCOMPAT.DLL” password storage ﬁle either during the
process of attempted authentication, or by partially mimicking the process.
While exploring some of the authentication features available in iFIX, in order to ﬁnd
potential mitigations for the password disclosure vulnerability described in the prior section, it was observed that network authentication was available to be activated and used.
This is implemented by placing the “security” ﬁles (included the “XTCOMPAT.UTL” described in the prior section) on a CIFS/SMB share, and changing the client security settings
to point to the security ﬁle on the network share. This type of ﬁle sharing is built into the
Windows operating system and is often used on home and small business networks for
sharing ﬁles and other resources between computers. It is, by default, unencrypted. This
functionality comes at the cost of very little added code to iFIX, as network shares of this
type can be accessed by programs using the same Windows API calls as those used to
access ﬁles on local drives.
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By monitoring the network connection of a system authenticating using this mechanism, it was observed that the client iFIX process reads the entirety of the “XTCOMPAT.UTL” ﬁle over the network during authentication. If an attacker can observe this
trafﬁc, he or she can extract and recreate the password ﬁle from network trafﬁc and use the
techniques described in the previous vulnerability to decode passwords for all of the users
of the system.
This problem is compounded by the fact that the entire ﬁle is transmitted, regardless of
whether or not the attempt to authenticate is successful. An attacker, given knowledge of
how the iFIX installation is conﬁgured, or through routine scanning common to attackers,
could determine the location of the shared security ﬁles on the network shared folders and
download the ﬁle independent of any iFIX process. This also results in the compromise of
all users of the iFIX system.
This can be exploited by attackers on a local wired or wireless network segment through
network monitoring. Remote exploitation may be possible if the network share is not
suitably protected from incoming connections from external networks. This ﬂaw results
in the same level of compromise as the previous password disclosure vulnerability, though
it may be easier to exploit in some conﬁgurations. It does not provide a more secure
alternative to local storage of passwords, as one would hope or expect upon discovering
the feature exists.
Like the prior password disclosure vulnerability, this is a ﬂaw introduced in the design
phase of development. Before development of a network authentication feature, requirements should be set forth on how it is to be implemented, and evaluated to ensure that it
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is being done safely. By relying on the ability of the ﬁle manipulation functions in the
Windows API to read network-addressable ﬁles, essentially no extra code was needed to
implement network authentication. The problem with this approach is that it also does not
allow the the application developer to interject in the process any form of access control or
authentication protocol.
This vulnerability violates the design principle of “fail-safe defaults” as described by
Saltzer & Schroeder [33]. This principle argues that, by default, access to objects should
be forbidden or restricted, and that access to only those objects needed for a speciﬁc task
should be granted at any given time. This results in a conservative design where, in this
case, only the information needed to authenticate one user should be accessed and transferred for a given attempt at authentication.
To mitigate this vulnerability, the HMI developers would need to either avoid this functionality entirely, or utilize a protocol, perhaps similar to Kerberos, that would allow for
users to authenticate with a central authority that would then hand out the capabilities to
the users to perform actions on the various systems in a network of iFIX installations. This
would be considerably more complex than the current network authentication mechanism,
and would likely require changes to the architecture of iFIX to support checking the access
tokens at every access to resources.
The only effective mitigation for this vulnerability that SCADA stakeholders can implement is to disable this functionality, which may or may not be an option. The risk of
compromise can be limited only if access to each workstation can be effectively controlled,
as well as access to all of the network infrastructure between the authenticating system and
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the system hosting the shared password ﬁle. If a Windows domain controller system can be
set up to centrally authenticate and identify users, this may serve as an alternative to iFIX’s
built-in network authentication, although there are vulnerabilities with this implementation
as well, which will be discussed in the next section.

4.1.3

Authentication Bypass

For an authentication process to be secure, it must be implemented in a way that
ensures that unauthorized users can’t manipulate the process. From the moment a user
provides their credentials, the process should be able to look up the user name, hash the
provided password, check that password against a stored hash, and make a decision about
allowing or denying access without outside interference. If this cannot be guaranteed, a
malicious process may be able to change hashes to match, or short-circuit the ﬁnal allowor-deny decision.
In vulnerable version of iFIX, the entirety of the iFIX system, including the authentication process, operates in the context of the currently logged-in Windows user. While
modern versions of Windows are multi-user and multi-tasking, and prevent processes from
allocating and modifying the memory of other processes directly between different privileged users, there are programmatic ways that a process can access the memory space and
context of another process running as the same user. This is used by debuggers and other
development tools to examine and instrument running programs.
By “attaching” the Immunity Debugger to the authentication process, it was possible
to trace the authentication process after a user-name and password was provided by the
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user. While directing the execution through the debugger, the authentication process was
observed. The provided user-name and password were encrypted using the exclusive-or
key described in a prior vulnerability, and compared with the contents of the “XTCOMPAT.UTL” ﬁle. Based on the results of this comparison, a branching instruction is used to
determine if “allow” or “deny” code is executed.
The code that implements this process is located in a dynamic library called “secmgr.dll”
that is loaded into the memory space of the authentication program “login.exe”. The relevant function in “secmgr.dll” is called “sec login”. By tracing through “sec login”, the
exact point at which a decision is made based on the authentication procedure was identiﬁed. That instruction took the form of “JNZ” (Jump if the Zero Flag is not set). A single
bit of the opcode was changed to reverse the direction of this branching logic, turning it
into a “JZ”, or “JE”, instruction (Jump if the Zero Flag is set). The modiﬁed code was
written out to a copy of “secmgr.dll” in another location on the ﬁle-system, and a direct
copy of “login.exe” was placed in the same directory. This modiﬁed copy of the login process could then be executed from this alternative location (or even an external USB drive),
which allows an attacker to log into the system with the incorrect password, instead of the
correct one. The same copy could be written over the original, in order to effect a denialof-service that would allow incorrect passwords, while denying access to legitimate users.
If measures were implemented to prevent all but the original process from authenticating,
a program could be written to patch the relevant bytes of memory directly in the correct
process.
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At ﬁrst glance, this authentication bypass would seem to be redundant for an attacker
to utilize, when the password ﬁle itself is so easy to recover and decode. This is a more
serious vulnerability, though, in that it is the result of an decision made by the developers
about the architecture of the entire iFIX system, rather than something that can be ﬁxed
by dropping in a hashing algorithm as a replacement for the exclusive-or encoding that
makes the password disclosure vulnerability possible. Also, while the password disclosure
vulnerability can be mitigated partially by enabling the ability to authenticate via local
or domain Windows accounts, that mitigation does not prevent this vulnerability, which
allows an attacker to reverse the decision logic after the “LogonUserA” call is made by the
authentication process.
This vulnerability can be exploited by any user who has local or remote access to the
interface for logging into the iFIX system, that also has some mechanism for running additional code on that system. As will be demonstrated in the next vulnerability description,
iFIX lacks the capability, even when operating in a restrictive user interface, to prevent
third-party code from running if the host operating system is conﬁgured to “auto-run”
code from USB or CD drives. While this functionality has been changed in recent versions
of Windows, many iFIX installations operating on older versions of Windows XP will still
allow for this bypass. In conjunction with other remote code execution vulnerabilities, this
vulnerability would easily allow an unauthorized outside party to escalate their privileges
within the iFIX system.
This ﬂaw illustrates a serious violation of the “least privilege” principle. This principle
states that each process should only operate using the least set of privileges necessary to
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accomplish the task at hand [33]. By operating the entirety of the iFIX system at the level of
privilege required to perform the most secure actions it is allowed to undertake, it becomes
impossible to prevent the end-user from modifying and manipulating processes that need
to be secured, such as authentication. This architectural ﬂaw has far-reaching implications
that this speciﬁc vulnerability only begins to illustrate. There would also be nothing in this
architecture to prevent third-party code from calling upon and manipulating other secure
processes of the system independently, including code that directly communicates to the
PLCs the HMI is monitoring and controlling.
To mitigate this vulnerability, the vendor would need to redesign the architecture of
iFIX in order to isolate the components of the system that need to operate at a higher
privilege from those that interact with the end-users at a lower level of privilege. Modern
operating systems have the capability to prevent users and services running at different
privilege levels from monitoring and manipulating each others’ processes. The iFIX system could be redesigned as a set of services and client programs that only communicate
to each other over well-deﬁned and limited protocols. All accesses to all secure elements
would need to be checked for authorization. For this speciﬁc vulnerability, a separate authentication or security service would be necessary to prevent malicious modiﬁcation and
replication of the process.
Much like the other iFIX vulnerabilities, the mitigation solution for SCADA stakeholders running the system is to control access to the systems running iFIX, and understand that
the protections afforded by iFIX’s documented ability to separate users of varying privilege level is ineffective. If a “ﬂattened” user model, where all users of the iFIX system are
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trusted with any action allowed on the iFIX system, is acceptable, then access control of
the system and network may be effective to maintain some degree of security.

4.1.4

Bypassing Run-Time Restrictions

With HMI software, it is often desirable to have a higher degree of control and limitation on local user actions than on mainstream IT systems. While most software takes
advantage of multiprocessing to co-exist with other programs running in the same interactive session, allowing users to split their attention and time between multiple programs,
HMI software is often meant to be the only software running with a user interface on a
workstation, commanding the entirety of the user’s time and attention. In this way, HMI
software frequently seeks to enforce a “kiosk” operating mode, keeping the user captive
in a highly controlled, full-screen interface. The name of this mode, utilized in some
mainstream software as well, is in reference it its use on kiosk-style computers such as
automated teller machines and vending machines.
In HMI software, this is meant to keep operator attention on the task at hand, preventing them from performing non-work related tasks on the HMI workstations. In addition,
this acts as a security measure, preventing client-side attacks and malicious code from
executing from external devices and network sources. This helps maintain the integrity
of a SCADA system, which might be lacking the latest operating system patches due to
isolation, driver or software incompatibility, or support issues.
If run-time restrictions such as these are not enforced completely, operators who ﬁnd
workarounds, either intentionally or by accident, may utilize them to maliciously circum42

vent controls and escalate privilege. Operators may also, with innocent intent, circumvent
controls in order to perform non-work related computing tasks, such as web browsing,
email, chat, and gaming on the HMI workstations. This activity often exposes HMI workstations to client-side security risks that they were not expected to mitigate by their design
or deployment. Run-time restrictions such as these “kiosk” modes may also serve as a
last-line of defense against surreptitious compromise by attackers that are able to establish
physical or remote access to the HMI interface.
In iFIX, there are restrictions that can be placed on lower-privileged users that prevent
them from switching the interface to other interactive programs or exiting the current fullscreen HMI interface. In vulnerable versions of iFIX, key combinations such as “alt-tab”
and “ctrl-alt-del” commonly used to exit and switch programs are intercepted by the iFIX
software and denied to users that do not have the appropriate privilege level assigned to
them in the iFIX user lists. Unfortunately, the software does not provide the ability to
restrict code from automatically running from external USB drives and CD/DVD discs as
they are inserted, on versions of Windows that allow for this behavior.
An attacker, or legitimate operator, may knowingly or unknowingly insert a USB drive
that is conﬁgured with malicious software designed to switch user interfaces, exit the HMI
program, or execute other malicious code outside of the scope of what the currentlylogged-in user is allowed. This may take the form of malicious software that spreads
unknowingly from drive to drive, or a malicious payload that targets the HMI directly to
attack the other vulnerabilities listed here for iFIX. The attacker may not need to be physically present, if a network connection is present and suitable for exﬁltrating the desired
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sensitive data or command and control. An example of such an attack would be to bribe
or blackmail an employee with physical access (such as janitorial staff) to simply insert
and eject a crafted USB device or CD. Another example would be to take advantage of
an employee that utilizes open USB ports for charging complex devices such as portable
media players and smart-phones that can be compromised. This kind of attack can even
span across so-called “air gapped” networks that are otherwise isolated from the public
Internet.
This is a violation of the Saltzer & Schroeder principle of “complete mediation”, which
states that every access to a resource must be checked to ensure the user holds the appropriate permission to access that resource[33]. By capturing some mechanisms of subverting
the captive interface, and letting others occur, all accesses are not being mediated.
This is a programming ﬂaw by the developers of iFIX, in that the design already exhibits an understanding that users may need to operate within a captive interface. This
vulnerability is simply a matter of not taking into account every possible way in which
malicious code might interactively execute. As with many vulnerabilities, the difﬁculty is
inherent in the fact that while developers must think of every possible way of bypassing
such controls, an attacker only has to ﬁnd one mechanism that hasn’t been blocked.
To mitigate this, developers of iFIX and HMI software seeking to offer a similar captive
interface must add in the capability to either disable or otherwise hook the functionality of
automatically running code from external devices and media. This is in addition to the
current mechanisms for intercepting undesirable keystroke combinations. This speciﬁc
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vector, automatically running code from external media, can be blocked through registry
modiﬁcation.
SCADA stakeholders can mitigate this speciﬁc vulnerability by following Microsoft’s
instructions for disabling auto-run functionality in the registry. Physical access to interface
ports, such as USB, should be restricted by either disabling the ports electronically, physically disconnecting, removing, or damaging the ports (a common solution is to ﬁll the
ports with epoxy), or by isolating the main “tower” of the computer away from the video,
keyboard, and mouse interface required by the end-user.

4.2

Iconics Genesis 32
The following are vulnerabilities discovered as a part of this research in Genesis 32,

an HMI package from Iconics. These vulnerabilities exist in version 9.22 of Genesis 32,
and all prior versions.

4.2.1

Authentication Bypass/Backdoor

For an authentication system to be secure, there must not be any “hidden” backdoors
or similar functionality that would allow a user to bypass the authentication measure. It
is, however, attractive for vendors and third-party solutions providers to insert mechanisms
that make it convenient to remotely administer systems installed at remote client locations.
End-users, not considering the security implications, may also see value in maintaining
backdoor access for use in emergency situations and to maintain access when disgruntled employees leave. The latter fear may be well-founded, as in 2010, a former systems
administrator for the city of San Francisco was sentenced to four years in prison for hold45

ing the login credentials of the city’s computer networks “hostage” after receiving a poor
performance review[46].
In mainstream IT software, the widespread adoption and connectivity of software by
many users across the Internet has discouraged vendors from inserting backdoors (for fear
of attackers gaining access). There have been recent examples. In January of 2013, SEC
Consult Vulnerability Lab disclosed a vulnerability across Barracuda Networks’ ﬁrewall
and virtual private network (VPN) product line that involves an SSH service allowing remote administrative access to a range of “white-listed” public and private IP addresses.
This backdoor access was intentional, in order to allow Barracuda to remotely support
customers’ devices, though it could result in compromises by attackers[35].
In Iconics Genesis 32, there is a program that allows administrative users the ability to
add and remove users to the system, manage groups of users, and change the permissions
and security levels of users. This interface can be accessed by any user that has an “Security
System Administrator” ﬂag set on their account with that user’s user name and password.
In vulnerable versions of Genesis 32, the security login form not only contains the usual
ﬁelds for user name and password, but also provides a third, un-editable ﬁeld marked
“Challenge”, shown in Figure 4.1.
According to the Genesis 32 documentation included with the program, the purpose
of this feature is to provide SCADA stakeholders the ability to log into the system in
“emergencies” by providing the code next to “Challenge” to Iconics’ technical support
hot-line. Presumably after Iconics veriﬁes that the provider is a customer, an emergency
password is provided to the caller that can be placed in the “password” ﬁeld, while leav46

Figure 4.1
Iconics Genesis 32 security login, with “Challenge” feature.

ing the “username” ﬁeld blank. If the correct emergency password is provided, then the
security administration program will log the user in as the default security administrator
user.
The challenge value is not randomly generated. It cycles through the positive values of
a signed 16 bit integer at an approximate rate of 10 times per second, apparently “locks”
into a value (or the value is determined as a function of current time) when the prompt is
displayed. In other words, throughout the day, the challenge could be any integer from
0 through 32,767, repeating at different times of day. This portion of the program does
not make a network connection back to Iconics, therefore any response that their technical
support line provides must be checked locally within the security administration program.
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It was also observed that this “challenge” value is not unique to each installation or
Iconics customer. This, combined with the local nature of the response veriﬁcation, leads
to an immediate vulnerability that requires no reverse engineering or technical background.
There is nothing to prevent one Iconics customer (or someone who can convincingly pose
as as a customer on the phone) from acquiring a response code for another customer’s
system for which they are not authorized. Also, reminiscent of the saying “even a broken
clock is right twice a day”, anyone who has called in and received a response code has,
given good timing, the ability to log into any Genesis 32 security conﬁguration system at
a few speciﬁc moments in the day.
Correct timing is not needed by attackers, however, as there is also a vulnerability in
how this response is calculated. With all of the response calculations performed locally,
it is possible to locate the code responsible for this calculation, analyze it, and create a
tool that generates the correct response for a given challenge. By tracing the code through
the password veriﬁcation process with Immunity Debugger, and simultaneously examining
and commenting the static disassembly in IDA Pro, the code that veriﬁed the user-supplied
password against the correct response was located and analyzed.
In Figure 4.2 the relevant disassembly is presented. It was observed that the function
call at 0x0041051E accepted the challenge value as an ASCII representation of the integer
value, and placed what appeared to be a hash digest value into memory. To test this theory,
a number of hashing algorithms were separately run, providing each the same challenge
string until a matching algorithm, Message Digest 4 (MD4) was found. The subsequent
string manipulation truncates the hash digest to the ﬁrst 8 characters, and places the shorter
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digest into the local variable labeled in the disassembly as “correct challenge response”
(note that this string was added for clarity by hand in the disassembly process and does
not exist in the disk or memory image of the program). A pointer to this response and the
value provided by the user in the password ﬁeld is passed to a string comparison function
at 0x00410555. If the strings match, then a value of 1 propagates through a set of registers,
arriving back at EAX at the end of the function, causing the function to return the integer
1. If the strings do not match, the function returns a zero. The calling function uses this
value to determine whether the user is authorized.
With the knowledge that the correct response to the challenge is simply the ﬁrst 8 characters of the MD4 hash digest of the challenge, it is possible to implement this calculation
in a way that does not involve running code on the target system. A smart-phone can be
used with an appropriate calculator either as a native application or any of a number of
common web applications that perform hash calculations. An attacker could even arrive at
the system with a hard-copy printout of a subset of pre-calculated responses for a window
of time that he or she has predetermined for the attack. Source code for a proof-of-concept
python script that demonstrates how to calculate this value is included in Appendix A.1.
This vulnerability can be exploited locally, or through a remote desktop connection to the
vulnerable version of Genesis 32. As a result of this vulnerability, lower privileged users
as well as attackers without any user account can add users, remove legitimate users, and
escalate the privilege of existing users. No audit trail that would document this activity
could be found, however if one exists, it could easily be modiﬁed by the same attacker or
user.
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Figure 4.2
Iconics Genesis 32 challenge and response veriﬁcation
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This vulnerability violates the principle of “open design” as described by Saltzer &
Schroeder [33]. This principle states that the security of a mechanism should not depend
on the ignorance of the process by attackers. In this case, the secrecy of the responsegeneration algorithm is relied upon to prevent attackers from using it to bypass security
mechanisms. Upon close examination by an attacker (which is possible even in the demonstration or trial version of the Genesis 32 product), the security of this mechanism goes
away along with the secrecy of its algorithm. Using a more obscure hashing algorithm,
or one of the developers’ invention, would not make this more secure, as it would still be
possible to analyze and replicate (or copy) the functionality into another program.
This represents a ﬂaw in the design of the authentication system of this software. While
the requirements for the software may have included functionality to allow for emergency
authentication, the choice of procedure has resulted in this vulnerability. A more secure
solution would likely need to integrate public-key cryptography, using a response that is
digitally signed by the vendor (or other responsible party) that cannot be forged or replayed
to the authentication process. The size and complexity of this response may dictate that
it is to take place over the public Internet, which would be a security risk for systems
that are intentionally air-gapped from public networks. The creation of a secure means to
allow emergency authentication, or at least one that creates an immutable audit trail to an
individual, is likely an interesting problem for future work in this area.
The vendor, Iconics, has stated that they are removing this functionality until a more
secure solution can be found, so for SCADA stakeholders, the simplest mitigation is to upgrade to the latest version of Genesis 32. For stakeholders who are unable to upgrade their
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software, or require an emergency authentication backdoor, the only suitable mitigation is
to prevent non-trusted users from directly accessing the Genesis 32 software. Despite any
measures taken to separate users based on privilege and access, this vulnerability allows
any user to escalate privileges and access to the highest levels.

4.3

KEP Inﬁlink HMI
The following vulnerability was discovered as a part of this research in Inﬁlink, an

HMI package from KEP. This vulnerability exists in version 5.00.23 of Inﬁlink, and all
prior versions.

4.3.1

Password Disclosure

The vulnerability described in this section is similar to the password disclosure vulnerability in vulnerable versions of GE Fanuc iFIX described in section 4.1.1. While it is
generally accepted that, to be stored securely, passwords for users must have a “salt” value
applied and processed using a cryptographic hashing algorithm, some systems instead opt
for encrypting or encoding passwords in a way that is inherently reversible. While the
nature of a properly hashed password is that there is no procedure available to reverse the
hash to a password in a reasonable amount of time (attackers are limited to brute-force
and dictionary attacks), encoding the password in a way that the authentication mechanism
reverses in order to perform its duty allows malicious programs the option of performing
the same calculations to decrypt or decode passwords instantly. This is a design ﬂaw, and
is described in more detail in section 4.1.1.
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In vulnerable versions of KEP Inﬁlink HMI, much like iFIX, best practices are not
followed in storing passwords. While setting up and examining the security functionality of
an Inﬁlink project, as described in its documentation, it was observed that when a password
was set for a speciﬁc user, the number of asterisks in the masked version of the password
that is displayed in the interface remained constant, and equal to the number of characters
in the password, after exiting and re-entering the security interface, and even after exiting
and reloading the HMI project itself. This led to the discovery of the insecure password
storage.
When passwords are salted and hashed properly, the resulting hash value is of a ﬁxed
length, regardless of the length of the original password or hash. If this hash is stored,
rather than storing the password itself, then knowledge of the length of the password is
“lost” along with the details of each character. For this reason, in most programs that mask
passwords with asterisk characters, the values stored in memory “behind” the asterisks
in the edit box only represent the actual password when it is being interactively typed in
by the user. When the form or window closes and is brought back up, the presence of a
password is indicated by a ﬁxed number of asterisks in the same ﬁeld, but the value beings
stored is a simple placeholder with no relation to the actual password. If a password ﬁeld
is observed that retains the length, in asterisks, of the original password, then either the
original password is being stored in a way that is reversible (because the target software
itself is able to do so), or the length of the original password is being stored independently
of the hash. While it may not immediately seem to be as serious of a vulnerability to
disclose the length of a password, it does greatly reduce the amount of time it would take
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an attacker to brute-force or dictionary-attack a password hash, by reducing the possible
key space.
To conﬁrm the visual indication that passwords were not being securely stored, the
ﬁles contained within an Inﬁlink HMI project were examined before and after password
changes in order to determine where user information was being stored. Through this
process, it was identiﬁed that user information must be contained within a ﬁle with the
name “project.hmi”. This ﬁle was examined more closely during password changes, using
a hex editor to observe the speciﬁc bytes that change after passwords change. This revealed
that bytes relatively close to Unicode strings representing the user name changed each time
the password was modiﬁed, and that the encoded password itself was the same length as
the original password (identiﬁed in the binary data as a single-byte length ﬁeld, followed
by an encoded password of the length ﬁeld’s size in bytes). This revealed that a secure
cryptographic hashing algorithm was not being used to store passwords.
Suspecting that this encoded password may be using a similar exclusive-or scheme as
iFIX, a similar process as described in the iFIX analysis was used to extract the key from
Inﬁlink HMI. A known password of maximum length was set for a user in the project,
then ASCII representation of that password was exclusive-or’d bitwise with the encoded
password in the project ﬁle. The output of this exclusive-or was an ASCII string beginning
with the character “0”, and incrementing by one for each successive character. This key
was veriﬁed as being the key used for the password for all users and all project ﬁles by
using it to successfully testing it as an exclusive-or key with other users’ and projects’
encoded passwords. As a proof-of-concept, a small script was developed that locates user
54

records within an Inﬁlink “project.hmi” ﬁle, and quickly extracts and decodes the user
names and passwords. The source code for this script is presented as Appendix A.2.
Like the iFIX vulnerability, this vulnerability is a violation of the Saltzer & Schroeder
design principle of “open design”[33]. By relying on a “secret” key that is contained within
a mechanism that can be easily examined by an attacker, the security of the system is compromised. While it is difﬁcult to sufﬁciently protect passwords when the key to a reversible
encoding without generating a new key for each installation and user and protecting that
key, it is much easier and more secure to use a secure cryptographic hashing algorithm to
store the password in an irreversible format.
In this case, the vendor responded by issuing a patch that obscures the entirety of the
project.hmi ﬁle using a more complex encoding scheme than a simple exclusive-or. Upon
testing this patch, it was observed that once the project ﬁle is loaded into memory by
Inﬁlink, the user names and passwords are still stored and encoded in the same easilyreversible format as before. The code responsible for decoding the encoded project ﬁles
was located in the patched Inﬁlink software, and it was observed that no user-supplied
key is necessary to load and decode an encoded project ﬁle. With all of the requisite
information to decode the project ﬁle located in the project ﬁle itself, it would be possible
for an attacker to develop a new script to replicate this process, though this has not yet been
demonstrated. It was veriﬁed, however, that an attacker need only use the code already
existing in the patched Inﬁlink executable to load and decode the project ﬁle, after which
the decoded project ﬁle could be dumped to disk and decoded using the original script
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presented in Appendix A.2. As of the time of writing, Inﬁlink HMI remains vulnerable to
this attack.
SCADA stakeholders can mitigate this vulnerability, much like the iFIX vulnerability,
by controlling access to systems that run the Inﬁlink HMI. In the presence of a vulnerability
that compromises authentication, the HMI’s ability to separate privilege and access levels
is ineffective. Therefore all users with local or remote access to the HMI must be trusted
to the same high level of access. Passwords used on Inﬁlink HMI systems are likely to be
compromised, and should not be re-used for accounts on other systems.

4.4

WellinTech KingView
The vulnerabilities described in this section are in KingView, an HMI package from

Wellintech. These vulnerabilities exist in version 6.5.3 of KingView, and all prior versions.

4.4.1

Password Disclosure

The vulnerability described in this section is similar to the password disclosure vulnerability in Inﬁlink HMI described in the previous section, as well as the iFIX password
disclosure vulnerability described in section 4.1.1. In vulnerable versions of WellinTech
KingView, the ﬁle containing user information (including user names and passwords) for
a project is encoded with a very simple transform on each byte that is easily reversed. As
described in previous vulnerabilities in this chapter, this is also a violation of the Saltzer &
Schroeder principle of “open design”[33].
Files associated with a KingView HMI project were observed while changes were made
to the passwords of users within that project. Through this observation, it was conﬁrmed
56

that the “users.dat” ﬁle in the project directory contained user name and password information. A simple examination of the ﬁle in a hex editor did not reveal the plain-text presence
of user information. By setting and changing the characters of known maximum-length
passwords, it was determined that single-byte changes in the plain-text passwords had corresponding single-byte changes in the “users.dat” ﬁle, conﬁrming that the passwords are
not securely hashed. By comparing the encoded password with the known plain-text password, it was observed that every byte in the encoded data is the equivalent of the plain-text
byte bitwise inverted.
While the full format of the “user.dat” ﬁle was not completely analyzed, a tool was
written to invert all of the bytes in the ﬁle and display or save the resulting contents. By
doing this it was observed that the entirety of user records, including user names, descriptions, and passwords are stored using the same scheme. The tool used to perform this
transformation is presented as Appendix A.3.
The vendor released a patch that uses “a new encryption algorithm which is more effective and more practical”[44]. While the new algorithm has not been completely analyzed
at the time of writing, it was observed that the new algorithm is completely reversible,
though not as straightforward as a simple inversion. As before, the password ﬁelds retain
the length of the passwords behind asterisks, indicating that plain-text passwords are visible in memory. This was conﬁrmed by using BulletsPassView, a software package from
NirSoft that will reveal the passwords stored in memory for a text box masked by asterisks.
If BulletsPassView can recover a password from the application after it has opened a user
data ﬁle, it proves that the mechanism for storing the password is reversible. Even in the
57

absence of an easy-to-use script for decoding the user ﬁle, all an attacker needs to recover
the password from a user data ﬁle is the free demonstration copy of KingView, and a copy
of the free BulletsPassView utility.
To mitigate this vulnerability, SCADA stakeholders must evaluate the trust they place
in any users that could gain access to the user.dat ﬁle. This would be any user with remote
or local access to the system, including control panel operators that may not otherwise
have permission to access development, project conﬁguration, or higher-level engineering
interfaces. Passwords for KingView HMI systems should not be re-used on other elements
of the control system network.

4.4.2

History Server Heap-Based Buffer Overﬂow

It is important for the data structures of a running program to remain in a state that
is consistent with what that program, and its associated libraries, expects and is able to
process correctly. Speciﬁcally, when dealing with data structures that can be of variable
length, such as strings and other arrays of binary data, it is important that the appropriate amount of space is allocated in RAM to store that data, and that the boundaries of
that space are strictly enforced. Lower-level programming languages, such as C and C++,
typically make memory management the responsibility of the programmer, compared to
higher-level languages that dynamically resize data structures at runtime when boundaries
are exceeded. In lower-level languages, if a programmer omits boundary-checking, or
implements it incorrectly, then there is the potential for maliciously-formed data to write
past the boundaries of the original data structure. In the case of structures allocated dy58

namically at runtime from heap memory, the implication of such an overﬂow is that, at a
minimum, the program could crash, and potentially give the attacker the ability to run arbitrary code. Malicious code may run as a result of overwriting important data, located in
memory just after unchecked boundaries, such as function pointers, important applicationspeciﬁc variables (such as privilege level), or data structures that are used to manage heap
memory allocations. The overwrite typically attempts to take control over the processor’s
instruction pointer and direct it towards code the attacker injects as part of user input.
In vulnerable versions of KingView HMI, a ﬂaw was discovered by researcher Luigi
Auriemma in the way the History Server processes incoming network trafﬁc[49]. The
purpose of the History Server is to log data about control systems processes, to act as an
audit trail or for process improvement, for example. When the History Server module
receives network trafﬁc on port 777, it processes each packet by checking an opcode ﬁeld.
For opcode 3, space is allocated in heap memory for incoming data based off of one ﬁeld
in the packet that describes the number of incoming data elements. Data from the packet is
then copied into memory, with the amount based off another ﬁeld that describes the packet
size. If the size of the packet is set to be larger than the number of elements, then data from
the packet will be written past the boundaries set for the memory allocated for incoming
elements.
The implication of this ﬂaw is that an attacker can easily identify the ﬁelds in question
by examining legitimate trafﬁc to a KingView History Server, and then use that information
to craft data that will exploit the vulnerable code. At the most basic level, an exploit could
corrupt the heap in a way that would cause the History Server to crash. This denial-of59

service attack would, at least temporarily, prevent the History Server from logging the
process information that it normally acquires, allowing the attacker to perform actions in
other parts of the system that would, as a result, not be recorded. A more complex exploit
would have the capability to execute arbitrary code provided by the attacker at system-level
privileges on the system hosting the History Server, resulting in the complete compromise
of the KingView HMI and any other software or service running on the same system. A
complete remote-code execution exploit has not been published for this vulnerability and
one has not yet been developed as part of this research, however the reporting organization,
Zero Day Initiative, included in their advisory speciﬁcally that attackers “can exploit this
to remotely execute arbitrary code in the context of the service (Local System)”. Their
calculated Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) score also indicates that the
complexity of attacking this vulnerability is “low”[49].
This vulnerability can be classiﬁed as a programming error. Examining the disassembly
reveals extensive use of the Microsoft Foundation Class Library (MFC) in the KingView
software. MFC acts as a C++ wrapper around the Windows API, which indicates that it is
likely that the KingView software was written in C++. In lower-level programming languages such as C++, it is the programmer’s responsibility to enforce boundaries on arrays
and strings. Fields in incoming structures (such as packet data) that contain information
on the size of variable-length data are often used as cues to how much memory should be
allocated to store the incoming data, however it is easy for a programmer to mistakenly
allocate too little data. In this case, the confusion revolves around the use of two different
size ﬁelds that, under normal circumstances are proportionate, but that could be set differ60

ently by an attacker. The vendor responded to this vulnerability with a patch that prevents
this overﬂow from occurring.
To mitigate this vulnerability, SCADA stakeholders may install the patch provided by
the vendor. This would likely require the KingView system to be restarted (though not
the entire computer), which may have to wait for scheduled maintenance times for some
stakeholders. Another mitigation stakeholders may choose to implement until patching is
to adjust ﬁrewall rules to disallow access to port 777 on the History Server to potentially
malicious hosts. Well-designed ﬁrewall rules should deny by default and only allow connections that are necessary, so this may already in place for some stakeholders. Patches
should be applied as soon as possible, however, as ﬁrewall rules may not prevent attacks
from normally-allowed hosts that have been compromised.

4.4.3

KingView ActiveX Control Heap-Based Overﬂow

ActiveX is a technology provided by Microsoft that is primarily used by developers to
provide the ability to have native X86 code execute as a “control”, or part of a website being
displayed in a web browser on a Windows system. A memory corruption vulnerability
similar to one that may be present in traditional server and client programs can, in an
ActiveX control, open up a client system for an attack that arrives via malicious, attackercontrolled web pages.
In vulnerable versions of KingView HMI, a ﬂaw was discovered by researcher Carlos
Mario Penagos Hollmann in an ActiveX control used to provide an HMI interface to client
systems as a web page in a browser[50]. The vulnerability is a heap-based overﬂow sim61

ilar to the prior vulnerability, but in a different component of the software. The primary
difference is that in this vulnerability, the vulnerable code executes on client systems that
connect to KingView as a server. After a client system has the KingView ActiveX control
installed, it is then vulnerable to having any potentially any website load that control and
supply a malicious payload. This is in contrast to the prior vulnerability, which allowed an
remote attacker to attack the server itself.
The researcher has published an exploit for this vulnerability that, as a proof-of-concept,
launches calc.exe on the client system[50]. The code that launches calc.exe could be replaced by malicious code of an attacker’s choice. ICS-CERT, in its advisory on this vulnerability, assessed that successful exploit code could be created, but would likely experience
inconsistent results[17]. This indicates that while there might not be guaranteed success in
exploitation, that repeated attempts would likely eventually succeed, as is sometimes the
case with unreliable exploit code.
The implication of this for SCADA stakeholders is that a remote attacker could take
control of a workstation normally used by legitimate users to perform HMI tasks on a
KingView system. This would allow an attacker to then escalate to operator-level privileges on the KingView system itself by surreptitiously logging and using legitimate user
credentials on the client system. If the client system is used to access other elements of
the control system network, this ActiveX vulnerability could also lead to compromises in
those areas as well.
This vulnerability, much like the previous one, can be classiﬁed as a programming
error. This is, again, the result of not adequately checking the boundaries on an array, al62

lowing attackers the ability to overwrite data structures that are critical to the security of the
running process. While this can be rectiﬁed by inserting the bounds-check and replacing
the vulnerable ActiveX control with a patched version (as the vendor has done), the design
decision to have native compiled code execute on the client, executable by any website is
questionable. The functionality of the control could likely be implemented in web technologies such as HTML5 and JavaScript, which would reduce the likelihood of remote
code execution by taking advantage of rendering engines built into web browsers that are
constantly being tested in the mainstream IT software vulnerability analysis community.
SCADA stakeholders may mitigate this vulnerability by applying the patch, which,
since it does not require restarting the KingView system, should incur minimal downtime.
If a stakeholder determines the risk to be too great to use a technology such as ActiveX
that has a history of being a target of exploitation, then the web server component of
KingView could be disabled, and remote access to the HMI could be accomplished through
the use of remote desktop technologies. At this point, however, concerns about the local
authentication measures and password storage, as described earlier in this work, become
more important. If a stakeholder can implement ﬁltering in such a way that web browsers
on the client systems can only access the KingView web server, then this vulnerability
becomes much more difﬁcult for an attacker to successfully exploit.

4.5

Wonderware SuiteLink
The following vulnerability is in Wonderware, an HMI package from Ivensys. This

vulnerability exists in version 54 of the SuiteLink service, and all prior versions.
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4.5.1

Denial-of-Service Vulnerability

Denial-of-service vulnerabilities have a wide range of possible root causes, but in each
case, the end result is that services, normally provided for local or remote programs and
users, are disrupted in a way that can be damaging to an organization. In mainstream IT
software, denial-of-service attacks are frequently used by attackers to disrupt the operations
of businesses that social and political activists deem to be the targets of their protests. In
January of 2011, the Federal Bureau of Investigation executed search warrants on members
of hacker/activist group Anonymous, for denial of service attacks on payment processing
services provided by Paypal, Visa, and Mastercard [32]. More recently, the same activist
group switched from using the bandwidth of members and sympathizers to distributing
malware that enlists computing resources owned by individuals and organizations that are
not aware that their bandwidth is being used to attack targets that are even higher proﬁle than before, such as the U.S. Justice Department[31]. The hospital HMI compromise
documented in the introduction of this dissertation was performed, in part, in an attempt to
build a “botnet” to be used in denial-of-service attacks against government systems on July
4, 2009[42]. Denial of service targets are frequently chosen for their strategic importance
to target organizations, so it is feasible to consider that denial of service attacks on national critical infrastructure could in the future be launched by activist organizations such
as Anonymous, which has recently declared “war” on the U.S. government[9]. Nationstate attacker may also target SCADA/HMI systems with denial-of-service attacks during,
or as a precursor to, conventional warfare.
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While denial-of-service attacks in mainstream IT software can have a serious impact
on an organization’s operations, public face, and revenue stream, the effects are typically
limited to the duration of the attack. After a denial-of-service attack has ﬁnished launching, has been halted by the originator, or shut down by ﬁltering the offending trafﬁc, the
target system either immediately comes back “on line” and operational, or does so shortly
after a restart of the vulnerable software or operating system. Mainstream IT software
frequently deals with outages of commodity Internet services, and will often restore operation after a denial-of-service attack in a similar way to how it would respond to any other
outage. Software and hardware involved with control systems networks may have much
more complex procedures that need to be followed to take them on and off-line, and may
require human intervention. Systems that control physical processes may also have to cope
with real-world physical damage to components due to loss-of-control or other effects of
denial-of-service attacks. Among vulnerability analysts involved in testing mainstream IT
software, denial-of-service vulnerabilities are not valued as highly as other types of vulnerabilities. In the control systems community, however, the inherent dangers posed by
denial-of-service vulnerabilities should be considered.
In vulnerable versions of WonderWare SuiteLink, an application used to assist in connecting data sources to HMI software, Core Security discovered and published a denialof-service vulnerability that can be used by attackers to crash the SuiteLink software[10].
A packet can be crafted by a malicious program to connect to a SuiteLink installation remotely over TCP port 5413. The malicious packet contains a ﬁeld that controls the amount
of memory allocated for incoming data, which can maliciously be set to a very large 32-bit
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integer value that is impossible for the memory allocation to fulﬁll within a 4 gigabyte
process space. The memory allocation fails in such a case, and the SuiteLink process fails
to check for this error, causing an crash to occur once data is attempted to be written to
an invalid address. A published Metasploit framework module is publicly available that
exploits this vulnerability[3].
While the original Core Security Advisory presents the vulnerability as a denial-ofservice vulnerability, it states that exploitation as remote code execution “has not been
proven, but it has not been eliminated as a potential scenario”[10]. While the vulnerability does not appear to be in the analysis performed as part of this research exploitable
to directly execute remote code, it could serve a purpose in making the exploitation of
other potential vulnerabilities in SuiteLink easier by ﬁlling memory with known patterns,
or reducing the complexity of bypassing Address Space Layout Randomization using techniques presented by “Kingcope” recently[22].
For SCADA stakeholders, the immediate implication is that remote attackers can halt,
disrupt, or degrade the quality of service provided by WonderWare HMI products. This
may prevent operators from taking corrective action in case of an emergency, and may
result in difﬁculties bringing the system on-line. Without an audit trail of what caused the
outage, a SCADA system may go back on-line, only to be taken down again by the same
attack several times before the root cause is determined and patched.
This vulnerability is a programming error in which the developers did not consider
the possibility of a system call, such as one made for a memory allocation, to fail. Under normal circumstances and operation, it is unlikely that the allocation would ever fail.
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Attackers with control over the parameters to system functions, even as simple as allocation functions that only take a length argument, can provide parameters that intentionally
cause these functions to fail. Without proper error handling code after function calls, the
error code is treated as an address (which would have been a valid address under normal
circumstances) which results in an unhandled exception when data is written to the unallocated page in memory. Commonly accepted good programming practice is to check the
return value of functions, however rarely is it explained that there are sometimes security
implications associated with not doing so.
The vendor responded to this vulnerability by issuing a patch that corrects the programming error, and refers customers to a document available to customers on deploying
secure industrial control systems. The Core Security advisory details the time-line of communicating the vulnerability to the vendor, which illustrates some of the difﬁculties that
researchers face when reporting control systems security vulnerabilities to vendors that are
unaccustomed to receiving and reacting to researchers’ vulnerability reports. Difﬁculties
were faced by Core in ﬁnding a security contact within the organization, proving the existence of the vulnerability (at one point the vendor asked Core for the free and widely
available Python interpreter needed to run the proof-of-concept code), and in convincing
the vendor that the vulnerability was exploitable in common installations of the software.
Mitigations taken by SCADA stakeholders to prevent vulnerabilities of this nature include keeping up-to-date with patches for software installed in the control systems network, and ﬁltering network trafﬁc in order to only allow trusted systems to connect. By
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limiting the systems that can connect, the potential for malicious attackers to connect and
manipulate data being sent to services is greatly reduced, though not eliminated.

4.6

SpecView
The following vulnerability is in the SpecView HMI package. This vulnerability exists

in version 2.5 (Build 853) of SpecView, and all prior versions.

4.6.1

Web Server Directory Traversal

Directory-traversal vulnerabilities take advantage of modern operating systems capability to refer to data on ﬁle-systems by “relative” paths. Each ﬁle on a ﬁle-system has
a “fully qualiﬁed” path that uniquely identiﬁes the ﬁle among the other ﬁles on the ﬁlesystem. This path begins at the “root” of the ﬁle-system, and includes each hierarchical
directory that contains the ﬁle. Currently running programs have a “current working directory”, that is a path to a folder in which ﬁle operations by the program takes place by
default. For a web server, the current working directory might be the directory in which
the main index ﬁles are kept. Relative paths may be used by users and programs to refer
to ﬁles by their location relative to the current working directory. In relative paths, there
are directory names with special meaning: “.” representing the current directory, and “..”
representing the parent directory. The parent directory name can be concatenated one or
more times to represent higher and higher level directories in the ﬁle system (“../../../” to
represent “three directories up”, for example). Most programming language and operating system API functions accept either fully qualiﬁed or relative paths as part of the same
parameter.
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This gives rise to a class of vulnerability known as “directory traversal”. While a
developer may desire to restrict access to ﬁles on a web server to only those in the web
server’s document folder meant for public consumption, if web server paths used to access
pages and ﬁles are directly passed into ﬁle system API functions, there is the potential
for disclosing sensitive data to attacker who maliciously insert “..” directory names into
web requests. Such vulnerabilities can reveal private source code, ﬁles containing user
credentials (such as those described in this work as password disclosure vulnerabilities),
and allow an attacker to build a proﬁle of other vulnerable software on the system.
In vulnerable versions of SpecView, a ﬂaw was discovered by researcher Luigi Auriemma that exists in the optional web server component of the software. Some implementations of HMI software make use of web servers to provide a remote interface to client
systems running web browsers. In SpecView, a web server can be activated that hosts a
continuously updated image of the main display of the program. This web server is vulnerable to a path traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker to traverse up the directory
hierarchy past the limited location that is considered secure and available. As a result,
attackers can request and download arbitrary ﬁles from the system hosting SpecView. Exploitation of this vulnerability requires no special tool or script, apart from a standard web
browser[26].
Directory traversal vulnerabilities are typically the result of programmer error, rather
than design decisions. By not ﬁltering user input, or not using API functions to normalize paths before using them in ﬁle operations, ﬁle operations will read from unintended
sources. Once such pre-access checks are inserted, it can be assured that ﬁle operations
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will only take place within directories that are allowed. The vendor responded to this
vulnerability by releasing a new version that successfully addressed the issue[20].
SCADA stakeholders can mitigate this vulnerability by upgrading to the latest version
of SpecView. If this is not an option, or if an upgrade must be delayed, then disabling
the web server will prevent exploitation. If the web server must be in operation until an
upgrade can be performed, then access to the server should be restricted to IP addresses
that can be trusted not to be compromised and used to exploit the vulnerability.

4.7

Advantech Studio
The following vulnerability is in Advantech Studio, an HMI package from Advantech.

This vulnerability exists in version 61.6.0.0 of the ISSymbol ActiveX Control, and all prior
versions.

4.7.1

ISSymbol Multiple Heap and Stack-Based Overﬂow

The vulnerabilities described in this section are similar to the heap-based buffer overﬂow described in section 4.4.3. Advantech is a suite of tools for developing and deploying
SCADA HMI systems. The ISSymbol ActiveX control for Advantech is used as part of
a web-browser based interface to an Advantech HMI. Four buffer overﬂow ﬂaws were
discovered in the ISSymbol ActiveX control by Dmitriy Pletnev of Secunia Research[11].
In vulnerable versions of Advantech, there are four different overﬂow ﬂaws that have
been disclosed. The ISSymbol ActiveX control maintains an “InternationalOrder” property that can have string data copied to it past its normal boundaries. Another property,
“InternationalSeparator”, is also vulnerable in a similar way.
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Stack-based buffer overﬂow vulnerabilities are similar to heap-based overﬂows, although they are frequently easier to exploit. Data allocated as local variables to a function,
which are deallocated by the end of the function, are stored on the “stack”, a common data
structure in computer architecture that allows for data to be “pushed” and “popped” from
the top of the structure. When a function is called in programs compiled from C, C++, and
many other high-level languages, parameters to the function are pushed to the stack, along
with the address of the next instruction in memory after the function call. The memory
address for the function is then moved into the instruction pointer, where execution of the
function begins. At the beginning of the function, the pointer that denotes the top of the
stack is moved to allocate space for local variables. Often, a base pointer is maintained to
keep up with the “bottom” of the stack for each function at runtime, so this is frequently
pushed to the stack at the beginning of functions, then restored with a pop instruction at
the end to restore the stack state for the calling function. On Intel-based processors, and
many others, the stack “grows” down in memory, meaning that memory allocation on the
stack is accomplished by subtracting from the stack pointer. This means that character
strings and other arrays that begin at an address in memory and end at a higher address,
will, relative to the stack, begin “high” on the stack, and end “lower” on the stack. In cases
where program code allows a malicious user to overﬂow data in arrays on the stack, it is
possible to write past the boundaries of that variable, over the values of other variables on
the stack, and then ﬁnally over the stored base pointers and return address for the current
function. If an attacker can control the value on the stack that gets placed back into the
instruction pointer after the function is complete, then the attacker can use that to redirect
71

execution to code of the attacker’s choice. This type of vulnerability saw its ﬁrst widely
distributed examples and explanation published by “Aleph One” in the hacker magazine
“Phrack”[1]. Like heap-based buffer overﬂow vulnerabilities, stack-based buffer overﬂow
vulnerabilities are typically the result of not checking the boundaries of a destination data
structure before copying data into it, which is a programming error.
In vulnerable versions of Advantech’s ISSymbol, there are stack-based buffer overﬂow
vulnerabilities in a windowing procedure, as well as a log ﬁle generation procedure. By
passing an over-sized amount of data to the “OpenScreen” method of the control, an exploitable overﬂow can occur. By setting a large string to the “LogFileName” property, an
exploitable overﬂow can also occur in the log ﬁle generation process. These vulnerabilities
allow attackers to run arbitrary code on the systems that have the ISSymbol control.
ICS-CERT has reported that the ﬂaw has been ﬁxed by the vendor in a newer version
of the Advantech Studio product[21]. Since this is an attack that takes place against client
systems that normally connect to Advantech systems, mitigations (other than patching) for
SCADA stakeholders should either involve discontinuing use of remote access or controlling the web hosts that client systems are allowed to contact.

4.8

Sielco Sistemi Winlog
Vulnerabilities of four different types were analyzed, based on an advisory discussing

7 ﬂaws discovered in the Sielco Sistemi Winlog SCADA HMI software by researcher Luigi
Auriemma[25]. Two of the vulnerability types, stack-based buffer overﬂow and directory
traversal, have been discussed in relation to ﬂaws in other products earlier in this chapter,
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while the other two types, arbitrary writes and function pointer control, are introduced in
this section. In vulnerable versions of Winlog, a TCP service can be activated to provide
remote services to clients. It is this service that these vulnerabilities exist.
It is interesting to note, that for these vulnerabilities, an attempt was made by the vendor
to repair the vulnerabilities, but the code inserted to check for parameters that indicate
overﬂow conditions was not adequate initially. A version of the software was released
that attempted to detect an overly-large amount of data being copied into the target buffer,
however the check was performed using a signed integer, meaning that negative values that
evaluated in an unsigned context as being very large, continued to allow for exploitation.
The vendor, Sielco Sistemi, after working with ICS-CERT and researchers including
Auriemma that had reported the vulnerabilities independently, released an upgrade that repairs the programming ﬂaws associated with these vulnerabilities. One mitigation option
for SCADA stakeholders other than upgrading is to disable the TCP server functionality in
the software. Unfortunately, it’s unlikely that this was enabled without there being an operational need. While preventing connections to the TCP server from unknown hosts may
prevent direct exploitation, it does not prevent attacks launched from other compromised
machines on the control system network.

4.8.1

Function Pointer Control

While in Luigi Auriemma’s advisory this type of vulnerability is classiﬁed as “code
execution”[25], in this work, the term “function pointer control” is used. The purpose of
this terminology change is to separate this type of vulnerability from other types (such as
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stack or heap-based buffer overﬂows) that are functionally different, yet also result in the
execution of malicious code. Any code that calls functions by an address relative to a value
either directly taken from or derived from user input runs the risk of having malicious code
hijack the call to redirect execution in unexpected ways.
In vulnerable versions of Winlog, three vulnerabilities of this nature were discovered. The functions in which the vulnerable code exists are the “DblGetRecordCount”,
“@Db@TdataSet@Close@qqrv”, “DblSetToRecordNo”functions. In each of these vulnerabilities, code exists that loads a pointer from user-controlled input data into a register,
followed by a call instruction that sends the execution path to an address deﬁned within
the user-controlled data. The impact of this is that remote attackers can provide malicious
code to execute, then easily direct the path of execution to that supplied code. Much like
buffer overﬂow vulnerabilities, this type of vulnerability is the result of programmer error,
failing to properly sanitize input data in such a way as to prevent users from being able to
provide data that gets loaded into the target of a function call.

4.8.2

Arbitrary Write

In this section, as in the last, this work has taken the liberty of referring to the “write1”
and “write4” with another term, “Arbitrary Write” that states the nature of the vulnerability
in a more verbose form[25]. In the advisory’s terminology, the numbers “1” and “4” are
in reference to the number of consecutive bytes an attacker would have control over upon
successful exploitation. This information is useful for vulnerability analysts and these
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are generally-accepted terms in that community, though for the purposes of this work it’s
useful to bring these terms under one broader category.
An arbitrary write vulnerability is a ﬂaw in which an attacker is given the capability
of potentially writing a sequence of bytes of the attacker’s choice to the attacker’s choice
of addresses in memory. In general, this is the result of code being written that, in some
way, allows an attacker to simultaneously control both a pointer to a location where data
is copied, and the data to be copied to that location. This may also be the end-result
of attempting to exploit a difﬁcult overﬂow vulnerability as well. Often, in some way the
value being written to memory is limited in some way (disallowed null bytes, for example),
and/or the range of memory that can be written to is sometimes limited as well. The
end-goal of an arbitrary write vulnerability is typically to overwrite a function pointer or
important application-speciﬁc data structures (such as privilege levels for users).
One of the Winlog vulnerabilities is a four-byte arbitrary write involving a user supplied index used to access a ﬁle pointer, and is described as being “very theoretical” to
exploit[25]. The more immediately exploitable vulnerability allows for a single null byte
to be written outside of buffer in question. While a single null byte arbitrary write is difﬁcult for an attacker to leverage into remote code execution, it could potentially be used to
change data structures that are used in access control, and easily used to cause a crash in a
denial-of-service attack.
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4.8.3

Stack-Based Buffer Overﬂow

In vulnerable versions of Winlog, a stack-based buffer overﬂow exploit exists where
a call is made to the standard C “sprintf” function[25]. The purpose of “sprintf” is to
craft a string from a “printf”-style formatting string and a set of arguments (that ﬁll in
marked-up elements of the format string). The crafted string is placed in memory at a
pointer passed to “sprintf” as the ﬁrst argument to the function. The “sprintf” function
relies on the programmer to ensure that the crafted string is not larger than the amount
of memory allocated for it and passed as a pointer in the ﬁrst argument. User-controlled
format string arguments can often be provided that will result in the destination string being
completely overwritten, along with whatever data is present on the stack or in-memory at
higher addresses past the destination string. Stack and heap-based overﬂow vulnerabilities
due to insecure use of “sprintf” are so widespread, that it’s frequently used as a classroom
or training example, and US-CERT has included a discussion of the problem in a set of
best practices for developing secure code[34].

4.8.4

Directory Traversal

In vulnerable versions of Winlog, a directory traversal vulnerability exists that is similar in concept to the one disclosed earlier in this chapter in the SpecView HMI package[25].
This vulnerability is in a TCP server that implements an application-speciﬁc protocol,
which makes it a more difﬁcult vulnerability to ﬁnd and identify than a similar path traversal vulnerability in a web server, as was seen in SpecView. The implication, once discovered, however is the same: an attacker that can easily and reliably connect to this TCP
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service would be able to download any ﬁle on the ﬁle-system of the system running WinLog.

4.9

Control Microsystems ClearSCADA
The following vulnerability is in ClearSCADA, an HMI package from Control Mi-

crosystems. This vulnerability exists in all 2005, 2007, and 2009 versions of the ClearSCADA
software.

4.9.1

Authentication Bypass

A key principle of secure design described by Saltzer & Schroeder is that of “fail-safe
defaults”. This principle states, in part, that it is important that, in every failure mode of
a software system, that the default access control decision revert to disallowing access,
rather than granting access. In essence, if software “fails” it should do so into a “safe”
state. When considering control-systems software, it may seem desirable for the software
to fail into a state that allows for those on-hand during an emergency to take the steps
necessary to intervene. Keeping this case in mind, however, it must be recognized that
if malicious attackers realize that security is disabled or reduced in such failure states,
then attacks that intentionally induce these states can be leveraged into much more serious
complete compromises than simple denial-of-service. In any case, failing in a way that
allows remote users to gain unauthenticated access to a system has far more dangerous
implications than simply allowing local users to regain control of a system, and should be
avoided when possible.
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In vulnerable versions of Control Microsystems ClearSCADA HMI, a ﬂaw was discovered by researcher Jeremy Brown that can be used to potentially bypass authentication
measures in ClearSCADA by taking advantage of the lack of a fail-safe condition when
the database server crashes[18]. Speciﬁcally, if an exception occurs in the “dbserver.exe”
process, “Safe Mode” is activated, and remote users, including attackers, would then be
able to log in without authentication. This behavior can essentially turn what would have
been a temporary denial-of-service attack into a full remote compromise.
While a ﬂaw that would allow an exception to be induced in “dbserver.exe” (which isn’t
detailed in any advisory on this authentication bypass vulnerability) would be considered
to be a programming ﬂaw, the failure to prevent unauthorized logins when shut down into a
safety state is a design ﬂaw. While some applications of the software may require allowing
on-hand personnel the capability to manipulate the system in such states, the option to
fail-safe should be present, and arguably as the default.
The vendor, Control Microsystems, released a new version of the ClearSCADA software package that corrects this vulnerability by disallowing remote web logins when authentication is not possible due to a database server issue. The vendor also recommended
other mitigations that SCADA stakeholders could employ to mitigate this and similar vulnerabilities, including limiting network access to the HMI web server, and implementing
more secure communication for web communications, including installing security certiﬁcates to aid in validating the security of connections. It is interesting to note that in
the ICS-CERT advisory dated August 2011, Control Microsystems states that they recommend an upgrade to ClearSCADA 2010 or newer, stating that versions from 2009 and
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earlier would not be patched. Considering that many SCADA systems and networks do
not see frequent updates, and may run for many years on the same software with very little
change (indeed, changes are often difﬁcult to implement for technical and process safety
reasons), a support window for software of roughly two years may leave many networks
running ClearSCADA vulnerable to this issue despite the patch.
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CHAPTER 5
VULNERABILITY TAXONOMY FOR SCADA HMI SOFTWARE

Based on the analysis of the vulnerabilities presented in the previous chapter, a taxonomy has been developed that utilizes common and signiﬁcant characteristics of the vulnerabilities to place these vulnerabilities into descriptive categories. In this chapter, the
characteristics and categories are discussed, as well as a presentation of the taxonomy itself. Finally, the implications and application of this taxonomy are discussed, including
its impact on vulnerability discovery, stakeholder mitigation, education, and decisions that
relate to mitigation strategies.

5.1

Deﬁning Characteristics
This section describes some of the deﬁning characteristics used in this work to catego-

rize vulnerabilities.

5.1.1

Design Flaw vs. Programming Error

The clearest and most well-deﬁned characteristic to arise from research into HMI vulnerabilities is the distinction between design ﬂaws and errors introduced by mistakes made
in programming. This usefulness of this distinction is uniquely high for SCADA HMI software as well, as it has been observed in the original vulnerability analysis conducted in this
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research that design ﬂaws are relatively easy to ﬁnd in established HMI products that are
in wide use by stakeholders, compared to the difﬁculty of ﬁnding such vulnerabilities in
software that is in wide use among mainstream IT software consumers such as businesses
and individuals’ personal computers on the public Internet.
The vulnerabilities discussed in this work that reﬂect design ﬂaws are as follows:
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Password Disclosure
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Intercepting Network Authentication
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Authentication Bypass
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Bypassing Run-Time Restrictions
• Iconics Genesis 32 - Authentication Bypass/Backdoor
• KEP Inﬁlink HMI - Password Disclosure
• WellinTech KingView - Password Disclosure
• Control Microsystems ClearSCADA - Authentication Bypass

The vulnerabilities discussed in this work that reﬂect programming error are as follows:
• WellinTech KingView - History Server Heap-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• WellinTech KingView - KingView ActiveX Control Heap-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• Wonderware SuiteLink - Denial-of-Service Vulnerability
• SpecView - Web Server Directory Traversal
• Advantech Studio - ISSymbol Multiple Heap and Stack-Based Buffer Overﬂow (4
vulnerabilities)
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Function Pointer Control (3 vulnerabilities)
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Arbitrary Write (2 vulnerabilities)
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Stack-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Directory Traversal
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5.1.2

Internal vs External Attack Vector

The language most frequently used in vulnerability advisories when describing the network and host locations from which a vulnerability can be exploited uses the terms “local”
and “remote”. In this context, “local” vulnerabilities are those that require a presence on
the system, and are typically used by authenticated users to escalate privileges past what
they are allowed to have, and “remote” refers to vulnerabilities that can be exploited over
a network connection to the target system. Vulnerabilities described as “remote” are typically further described in terms of whether or not a user must be authenticated to exploit
the vulnerability in question. Pre-authentication remote vulnerabilities are obviously the
most dangerous, to the extent that sometimes less attention is paid to other vulnerability
types.
In the world of control systems software, speciﬁcally HMI software, with the targets
being of high value and strategic importance, and a variety of software packages working
together on a single network, it’s easy to imagine that attackers would be interested in
leveraging vulnerabilities above and beyond “remote pre-authentication”. Once one system
on a network has been compromised through such a vulnerability (or, indeed something as
mundane as a client-side exploit or social engineering), an attacker then has a much broader
selection of “local” exploits with which to move around in a system from a “remote”
location.
It’s this nature of critical infrastructure systems that contain SCADA HMI software,
that is the motivation to describe this characteristic in terms of “internal” and “external”.
The meaning is nearly the same, but the implication is that this is a description of where
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the attack is launched, rather than the attacker’s position. “Internal” can include malicious
insiders and other physically “local” threats, but also includes remote attackers that have
obtained a foothold in the system through some other vulnerability, and are motivated to
continue their inﬁltration. “External”, as the companion term, retains much of the original
meaning and implication as the more common term, “remote”.
The vulnerabilities discussed in this work that represent internal vulnerabilities include:
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Password Disclosure
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Authentication Bypass
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Bypassing Run-Time Restrictions
• Iconics Genesis 32 - Authentication Bypass/Backdoor
• KEP Inﬁlink HMI - Password Disclosure
• WellinTech KingView - Password Disclosure

The vulnerabilities discussed in this work that reﬂect programming error are as follows:
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Intercepting Network Authentication
• WellinTech KingView - History Server Heap-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• WellinTech KingView - KingView ActiveX Control Heap-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• Wonderware SuiteLink - Denial-of-Service Vulnerability
• SpecView - Web Server Directory Traversal
• Advantech Studio - ISSymbol Multiple Heap and Stack-Based Buffer Overﬂow (4
vulnerabilities)
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Function Pointer Control (3 vulnerabilities)
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Arbitrary Write (2 vulnerabilities)
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Stack-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Directory Traversal
• Control Microsystems ClearSCADA - Authentication Bypass
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Note that in assigning this characteristic, the nature of the vulnerability itself and the
exploitability of it externally was determined independent of any mitigating controls that a
control system network could (and should) have in place to restrict access to such applications to the outside word, reducing attack surface.

5.1.3

Difﬁculty of Exploitation

This characteristic is a description of the difﬁculty of exploiting the vulnerability
against a target, given currently available public information. While this characteristic can
change over time (for example, a highly skilled attacker could publicly publish an exploit
for a vulnerability that would be difﬁcult for the average attacker to create “from scratch”),
considering “exploitability” in this context is more useful than looking at the complexity
of the vulnerability or exploit, since it is a measure of how likely it is, currently, for an attacker to make use of a certain vulnerability. It provides no service to analysts to measure
the technical complexity of a vulnerability as being very high, when a publicly available
exploit makes it accessible to relatively unskilled attackers.
The terminology used to describe the “difﬁculty of exploitation” characteristic of this
taxonomy is limited to “trivial” and “non-trivial”. “Trivial”-difﬁculty vulnerabilities are
those which have working public exploits that are easily launched against target systems,
or have enough publicly available information that an attacker with experience in a scripting language and a basic knowledge of exploitation techniques could quickly develop an
exploit. “Non-trivial”-difﬁculty vulnerabilities are those for which the associated advisories have stated that exploitation is difﬁcult or unproven, or where no exploit code has
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been given for more complex vulnerability types such as heap-based buffer overﬂow vulnerabilities.
It is worth noting that a vulnerability can change from “non-trivial” to “trivial” rapidly,
given the attention of an experienced vulnerability analyst, the discovery of alternate methods of exploitation for a particular vulnerability, or a miscalculation of the original exploitability. It is simply meant as a guideline to the likelihood of seeing the vulnerability
being used “in the wild”, compared to seeing vulnerabilities that are known and documented with publicly available exploit code. The determination of exploitability is considered in relation to the vulnerable versions of the product, regardless of patches put in
place by vendors since. Other characteristics describe vulnerabilities in terms of mitigation
effectiveness.
The vulnerabilities discussed in this work that represent trivial to exploit vulnerabilities
include:
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Password Disclosure
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Authentication Bypass
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Bypassing Run-Time Restrictions
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Intercepting Network Authentication
• Iconics Genesis 32 - Authentication Bypass/Backdoor
• KEP Inﬁlink HMI - Password Disclosure
• WellinTech KingView - Password Disclosure
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Directory Traversal
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Stack-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• Wonderware SuiteLink - Denial-of-Service Vulnerability
• SpecView - Web Server Directory Traversal
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The vulnerabilities discussed in this work that represent non-trivial to exploit vulnerabilities are as follows:
• WellinTech KingView - History Server Heap-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• WellinTech KingView - KingView ActiveX Control Heap-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• Advantech Studio - ISSymbol Multiple Heap and Stack-Based Buffer Overﬂow (4
vulnerabilities)
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Function Pointer Control (3 vulnerabilities)
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Arbitrary Write (2 vulnerabilities)
• Control Microsystems ClearSCADA - Authentication Bypass

5.1.4

Vendor Patch Status

While all of the vulnerabilities that are discussed in this dissertation have been addressed by the vendors, it is important to note that there is often a delay between public knowledge of a ﬂaw and an adequate ﬁx. In some cases, a vendor patch does not
completely address the vulnerability, leaving systems open to continued exploitation. The
characteristic terms used in this taxonomy to identify vendor patch status are “unpatched”,
for vulnerabilities that have not been addressed by the vendor; “addressed”, for vulnerabilities that have been addressed by a patch or new version by the vendor, but the vulnerability
remains exploitable in some way; and “patched”, which indicates that a complete patch for
the vulnerability has been distributed by the vendor.
All of the vulnerabilities in this work fall can be described as “patched”, with the
exception of the the following “addressed” vulnerabilities which have not been completely
addressed:
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Authentication Bypass
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• KEP Inﬁlink HMI - Password Disclosure
• WellinTech KingView - Password Disclosure

No vulnerabilities in this work are described as “unpatched”. Even given the lack of
case studies in this work that have this characteristic, it’s important to have it deﬁned as
many vulnerabilities go through an unpatched phase for a period of days, weeks, or months
before a vendor patch is available. During this time, vulnerabilities that are unpatched
are given careful analysis from vulnerability experts, and must be mitigated with other
measures by SCADA stakeholders.

5.1.5

Non-Patch Mitigation Effectiveness

Another important characteristic of vulnerabilities in HMI software is the effectiveness
of mitigations that stakeholders can put in place until patches are available and applied.
Control systems networks often have requirements for verifying and testing patches and
new versions of software, and limited maintenance windows of time in which changes can
take place, so there is likely to be a larger amount of time between a patch being made
available and it actually being applied to vulnerable systems in some control systems. In
the time between the moment a stakeholder becomes aware of a vulnerability, and the
availability and application of a patch, mitigation techniques may have to be applied (if
available) to secure systems.
This characteristic is highly dependent on the details of each speciﬁc control system
network. Individual networks’ security personnel may have to decide on how to apply this
characteristic to vulnerabilities relative to their own organizations. For the purposes of this
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work, and as a recommendation for future work that assigns values to this characteristic
outside of the context of a speciﬁc network, the term “effective” is used to describe vulnerabilities that have measures present that make exploitation more difﬁcult for an attacker.
For example, in this work, it is assumed that most web clients to HMI systems can be restricted to only viewing web pages related to the HMI system they are connected to, and
such a mitigation could be described as “effective”. “Ineffective” is used to describe vulnerabilities for which there are no mitigation techniques, the mitigation strategy provided
is incapable of preventing exploitation, or the mitigation strategy is so restrictive that it is
impractical to implement. An example of the latter would be a mitigation that requires a
network service, that is presumably being used for some purpose, to be disabled.
The vulnerabilities discussed in this work that have mitigations judged, in the context
of this work, to be effective include:
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Password Disclosure
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Authentication Bypass
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Bypassing Run-Time Restrictions
• WellinTech KingView - KingView ActiveX Control Heap-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• Iconics Genesis 32 - Authentication Bypass/Backdoor
• KEP Inﬁlink HMI - Password Disclosure
• WellinTech KingView - Password Disclosure
• Advantech Studio - ISSymbol Multiple Heap and Stack-Based Buffer Overﬂow (4
vulnerabilities)

Note that vulnerabilities that can be mitigated by “wrapping” access to the vulnerable
code in authenticated remote access, or by only allowing fully trusted users local access,
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are considered “effective” in this work. This may not be realistic in some real-world installations.
The vulnerabilities discussed in this work that either have no mitigation strategy, or
have mitigations judged, in the context of this work, to be ineffective include:
• GE Fanuc iFIX - Intercepting Network Authentication
• WellinTech KingView - History Server Heap-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• Wonderware SuiteLink - Denial-of-Service Vulnerability
• SpecView - Web Server Directory Traversal
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Function Pointer Control (3 vulnerabilities)
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Arbitrary Write (2 vulnerabilities)
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Stack-Based Buffer Overﬂow
• Sielco Sistemi Winlog - Directory Traversal
• Control Microsystems ClearSCADA - Authentication Bypass

5.2

Categories
Through the comparison of characteristics that are common between a number of vul-

nerabilities, it is observed that across characteristics, categories of vulnerabilities can be
deﬁned that contain and summarize the characteristics of the vulnerabilities within them.
While there will always be vulnerabilities that are exceptions to these categories, categorization of the most critical, easiest to ﬁnd, or easiest to address vulnerabilities has implications for stakeholders and vulnerability analysts that will be presented in the last section
of this chapter. In the next section, “Presentation”, a selection of the categories will be
shown in tabular form.
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In the analysis of the characterizations, and subsequent attempt to classify vulnerabilities into one (and only one) category each for the purpose of generating a taxonomy, it was
observed that categories seen as useful for SCADA stakeholders have characteristics that
overlap in categories that are useful for SCADA HMI vendors and vulnerability analysts.
For this reason, a higher-level division is made, representing the categories in the form of
two taxonomies, one primarily of interest to SCADA stakeholders seeking to protect and
monitor SCADA HMI deployments, and a second taxonomy (built from the same set of
characteristics) that is of interest to SCADA HMI vendors seeking to improve development practices and vulnerability analysts that are either seeking new HMI vulnerabilities
or learning about vulnerability analysis in an educational environment.

5.2.1

Stakeholder Taxonomy

The following categories describe vulnerabilities in a way that is intended to be useful
to assist SCADA stakeholders in prioritizing work on patching, mitigation, layered defenses, and monitoring. By categorizing vulnerabilities that require modiﬁcations (patches
or upgrades) to software packages as critical, stakeholders can, as rapidly as possible, begin
the process of testing and veriﬁcation that may be needed to implement such modiﬁcations.
For vulnerabilities that can be addressed by operational or conﬁguration changes, independent of vendor software modiﬁcation, categories deﬁne the type of monitoring stakeholders
should implement in order to detect intrusion attempts.
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5.2.1.1

Critical External

Vulnerabilities categorized as “Critical External” are the most dangerous to control
system networks, and should be of the highest concern to those tasked with securing them.
Vulnerabilities in this category have a Non-Patch Mitigation Effectiveness of “ineffective”,
indicating that stakeholders must take steps to address the issue with vendor patches once
they are made available. Finally, to narrow this category to vulnerabilities useful for remotely gaining a foothold in a control system network, vulnerabilities in this category have
an Attack Vector characterization of “external”.

5.2.1.2

Critical Internal

Vulnerabilities categorized as “Critical Internal” should be of the high concern to those
tasked with securing control system networks, as internally exploitable vulnerabilities are
useful to attackers seeking to further damage and compromise control systems networks
after a compromise. Vulnerabilities in this category have a Non-Patch Mitigation Effectiveness of “ineffective”, indicating that stakeholders must take steps to address the issue with
vendor patches once they are made available. Finally, to narrow this category to vulnerabilities useful for inside threats and attackers who have established a foothold in a control
system network, vulnerabilities in this category have an Attack Vector characterization of
“internal”. This category is in place as a companion to Critical External, even in the absence of current vulnerabilities in the case studies that precisely match this criteria. Both
categories must exist however, in order to categorize new vulnerabilities that match these
characteristics before vendor patches and mitigation strategies are available.
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5.2.1.3

Stakeholder Addressable - Logging

Vulnerabilities categorized as “Stakeholder Addressable - Logging” are those that control systems network operators or security administrators have the capability to secure their
systems against with immediately available resources, and are trivial to exploit by attackers. While vulnerabilities in this category are easily exploited by attackers with relatively
low skill and resources, they are also easily mitigated by stakeholder action. “Logging”
in the context of this category indicates that stakeholders should keep separate logs of
attempts against vulnerabilities in this category, at least until vendor patches are made
available, in order to detect opportunistic attacks by attackers that hope to ﬁnd a target
that hasn’t implemented mitigations. These logs could help identify threats and trends in
attack trafﬁc. Vulnerabilities in this category have a Non-Patch Mitigation Effectiveness of
“effective”, and a Difﬁculty of Exploitation characteristic of “trivial”.

5.2.1.4

Stakeholder Addressable - Alert

Vulnerabilities in the category of “Stakeholder Addressable - Alert” are those that
should be monitored for exploitation attempts with alerts generated for immediate attention, even in cases where the vulnerabilities are mitigated, due to the difﬁculty of exploitation. Attempted exploits against difﬁcult-to-exploit vulnerabilities are indicative of
advanced threats or the new availability of public exploits (and the need to re-characterize
and reclassify associated vulnerabilities). Vulnerabilities in this category have a Non-Patch
Mitigation Effectiveness of “effective”, and a Difﬁculty of Exploitation characteristic of
“non-trivial”.
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5.2.2

Vendor and Analysis Taxonomy

Though the immediate beneﬁt of this work is to improve the security of critical infrastructure by giving stakeholders the tools needed to categorize and prioritize the way they
address vulnerabilities, assisting HMI software vendors and vulnerability analysts also can
have an impact on the security of critical infrastructure. Educating vendors and analysts on
the design principles and programming practices of secure software development, in the
context of existing vulnerabilities that meet certain characteristics, can help identify other
similar vulnerabilities that are currently undiscovered, and prevent the same problems from
arising in future software. For vulnerability analysts, the distinction between “internal” and
“external” has an impact on how the vulnerabilities are exploited in proof-of-concept code.
For vendors, the same distinction can serve as a means for prioritizing efforts in patching
and secure development.

5.2.2.1

Design Flaw Internal

Vulnerabilities in this category have the characteristic of being the result of “design
ﬂaws”, and an attack vector of “Internal”. Privilege escalation vulnerabilities that take
advantage of secure design principle violations (such as a lack of complete mediation) can
frequently be categorized as “Design Internal”. Vulnerabilities in this category are often
the easiest to analyze, and could serve as educational examples in training analysts to ﬁnd
future critical issues in SCADA HMI software.
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5.2.2.2

Design Flaw External

Vulnerabilities in this category have the characteristic of being the result of “design
ﬂaws”, and an attack vector of “external”. An example of this category of vulnerability
can be seen in the network authentication of iFIX, where authentication is performed over
the network in a way that allows attackers to intercept all of the users’ credentials at once.
Vulnerabilities in this category could be prioritized for patching by vendors.

5.2.2.3

Programming Error Internal

Vulnerabilities in this category have the characteristic of being the result of “programming error”, and an attack vector of “internal”. Locally-exploitable programming errors,
can result in privilege escalation. Internal programming errors are often easier to exploit
and demonstrate, and can serve as introductory training material for both analysts and developers.

5.2.2.4

Programming Error External

Vulnerabilities in this category have the characteristic of being the result of “programming error”, and an attack vector of “external”. Vulnerabilities in this category represent
very dangerous vulnerabilities, in that they will not show up in a review of the design,
and are exploitable by remote attackers. For this reason, they are uniquely attractive for
vendors to prevent, and for vulnerability analysts to locate.
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5.3

Presentation
The following tables present the characteristics of each case study vulnerability in a

selection of the taxonomy categories (that have representation in the case study vulnerabilities) described in the previous section. Following the taxonomy categories is a combined
table of all of the case study vulnerabilities with their associated characteristics, so that
they can be easily compared directly.
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Vulnerability
iFIX - Auth. Intercept
SuiteLink - DoS
SpecView - Directory Traversal
Winlog - Stack Overﬂow
Winlog - Directory Traversal
ClearSCADA - Auth. Bypass
KingView - Server Heap Overﬂow
Winlog - Function Ptr. Control
Winlog - Arbitrary Write

Design/Coding
Design
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Design
Coding
Coding
Coding

Internal/External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External

Exploitation
Trivial
Trivial
Trivial
Trivial
Trivial
Non-Trivial
Non-Trivial
Non-Trivial
Non-Trivial

Stakeholder Taxonomy - Critical External

Table 5.1

Patch
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched

Mitigation
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
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Vulnerability
iFIX - Password Disclosure
iFIX - Auth. Bypass
iFIX - Run-Time Bypass
Genesis 32 - Auth. Bypass
Inﬁlink - Password Disclosure
KingView - Password Disclosure

Design/Coding
Design
Design
Design
Design
Design
Design

Internal/External
Internal
Internal
Internal
Internal
Internal
Internal

Exploitation
Patch
Trivial
Patched
Trivial
Addressed
Trivial
Patched
Trivial
Patched
Trivial
Addressed
Trivial
Addressed

Stakeholder Taxonomy - Stakeholder Addressable - Logging

Table 5.2

Mitigation
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
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Vulnerability
Design/Coding
KingView - ActiveX Heap Overﬂow
Coding
Advantech - Multiple Overﬂows
Coding

Internal/External
External
External

Exploitation Patch Mitigation
Non-Trivial Patched Effective
Non-Trivial Patched Effective

Stakeholder Taxonomy - Stakeholder Addressable - Alert

Table 5.3
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Vulnerability
iFIX - Password Disclosure
iFIX - Auth. Bypass
iFIX - Run-Time Bypass
Genesis 32 - Auth. Bypass
Inﬁlink - Password Disclosure
KingView - Password Disclosure

Design/Coding
Design
Design
Design
Design
Design
Design

Internal/External
Internal
Internal
Internal
Internal
Internal
Internal

Exploitation
Patch
Trivial
Patched
Trivial
Addressed
Trivial
Patched
Trivial
Patched
Trivial
Addressed
Trivial
Addressed

Vendor and Analysis Taxonomy - Design Flaw Internal

Table 5.4

Mitigation
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
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Vulnerability
iFIX - Auth. Intercept
ClearSCADA - Auth. Bypass

Design/Coding
Design
Design

Internal/External
External
External

Exploitation Patch Mitigation
Trivial
Patched Ineffective
Non-Trivial Patched Ineffective

Vendor and Analysis Taxonomy - Design Flaw External

Table 5.5
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Vulnerability
KingView - Server Heap Overﬂow
KingView - ActiveX Heap Overﬂow
SuiteLink - DoS
SpecView - Directory Traversal
Advantech - Multiple Overﬂows
Winlog - Function Ptr. Control
Winlog - Arbitrary Write
Winlog - Stack Overﬂow
Winlog - Directory Traversal

Design/Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding

Internal/External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External

Exploitation
Non-Trivial
Non-Trivial
Trivial
Trivial
Non-Trivial
Non-Trivial
Non-Trivial
Trivial
Trivial

Vendor and Analysis Taxonomy - Programming Error External

Table 5.6

Patch
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched
Patched

Mitigation
Ineffective
Effective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Effective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
Ineffective
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Vulnerability
iFIX - Password Disclosure
iFIX - Auth. Intercept
iFIX - Auth. Bypass
iFIX - Run-Time Bypass
Genesis 32 - Auth. Bypass
Inﬁlink - Password Disclosure
KingView - Password Disclosure
ClearSCADA - Auth. Bypass
KingView - Server Heap Overﬂow
KingView - ActiveX Heap Overﬂow
SuiteLink - DoS
SpecView - Directory Traversal
Advantech - Multiple Overﬂows
Winlog - Function Ptr. Control
Winlog - Arbitrary Write
Winlog - Stack Overﬂow
Winlog - Directory Traversal

Design/Coding
Design
Design
Design
Design
Design
Design
Design
Design
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding
Coding

Internal/External
Internal
External
Internal
Internal
Internal
Internal
Internal
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External
External

Exploitation
Patch
Mitigation
Trivial
Patched
Effective
Trivial
Patched
Ineffective
Trivial
Addressed Effective
Trivial
Patched
Effective
Trivial
Patched
Effective
Trivial
Addressed Effective
Trivial
Addressed Effective
Non-Trivial
Patched
Ineffective
Non-Trivial
Patched
Ineffective
Non-Trivial
Patched
Effective
Trivial
Patched
Ineffective
Trivial
Patched
Ineffective
Non-Trivial
Patched
Effective
Non-Trivial
Patched
Ineffective
Non-Trivial
Patched
Ineffective
Trivial
Patched
Ineffective
Trivial
Patched
Ineffective

Combined Case Study Vulnerability Characteristics

Table 5.7

5.4

Implications
This section describes implications of this work’s taxonomy for SCADA stakeholders,

HMI developers, and vulnerability analysis.

5.4.1

Mitigation Strategy

For SCADA stakeholders, this taxonomy, with adjustment of mitigation effectiveness
for the speciﬁcs of an organization, and maintenance of vendor patch status over time,
could serve to help prioritize efforts in securing and monitoring HMI software. “Stakeholder Addressable” vulnerabilities should be immediately addressed in order to bring
a system to a baseline of attainable security. “Critical External” vulnerabilities should
cause stakeholders to evaluate temporary changes in operational procedure or connection
to the outside world can be made to move Mitigation Effectiveness to “effective”. If not,
externally-facing systems must be closely monitored for compromise. “Critical Internal”
vulnerabilities should also be the target of monitoring. Finally, “Stakeholder Addressable
- Alert” vulnerabilities should have monitoring in place, locally at stakeholder organizations, and perhaps in a distributed and collaborative form as part of industry groups, in
order to determine when advanced attackers or new public exploit code arises.

5.4.2

Development

For SCADA HMI developers tasked with maintaining existing HMI software, “Design
Flaw External” and “Programming Error External” vulnerabilities should be prioritized for
patching. For those developing new HMI software, or attempting to re-architect existing
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HMI software to provide more security, “Design Flaw Internal” vulnerabilities should be
used in education and training material to illustrate concepts that are fundamental to designing secure software.

5.4.3

Vulnerability Discovery Strategy

Experienced vulnerability analysts tasked with ﬁnding vulnerabilities in HMI software
may ﬁnd the memory corruption vulnerabilities that they expect to ﬁnd in mainstream IT
software, and miss the even lower-hanging-fruit of design ﬂaws that are common to HMI
software, but infrequent in modern mainstream IT software. Analysts should examine the
vulnerabilities in the “Design Flaw Internal” category for examples of design ﬂaws that
may be found in other HMI software. This category of vulnerability has already been used
by the author of this work in the classroom for the purpose of educating undergraduate
and graduate students of information security on the basics of vulnerability analysis, and
to demonstrate the impact of design ﬂaws to SCADA stakeholders.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this ﬁnal chapter, conclusions are formed based on the analysis of vulnerability information and discussed in the form of answers to the original research questions posed
by this dissertation. Contributions to the ﬁelds of information assurance, information operations, critical infrastructure security, and education as a result of the taxonomy and
associated research are also discussed. Finally, potentially useful topics of future research
are presented, based on the questions that arose during the research of this taxonomy of
vulnerabilities.

6.1

Research questions
The research presented in this dissertation has suggested answers to the original re-

search questions:
It is clear, from the vulnerabilities presented in this work, that the vulnerabilities in
HMI software are common. Control systems software packages have traditionally seen
less attention from vulnerability analysts than mainstream IT software, resulting in vulnerabilities that have existed in legacy code far longer than it would have, given closer scrutiny.
This was observed in HMI packages in this research, speciﬁcally iFIX, containing vulnerabilities that have been in place in legacy code for decades. While analysis and exploitation
105

of vulnerabilities in any software package takes considerable time and effort, the initial
identiﬁcation of design ﬂaws that lead to vulnerabilities is relatively straightforward.
It is also clear that the numerous ﬂaws found in HMI software are, for the most part,
exploitable by a variety of attackers. Vulnerabilities that are likely to be exploitable from
outside of a control systems network appear to primarily be memory corruption vulnerabilities that are in place due to programmer error. Design ﬂaws appear to primarily be
exploitable by local attackers attempting to escalate privilege, or by remote attackers that
have gained a foothold into the target network via a vulnerability in another component
(control system speciﬁc or software packages common with mainstream IT software).
It was observed that, across multiple HMI vendors, similar ﬂaws with common characteristics exist that can be categorized together into a taxonomy and addressed in those
categories to make mitigation, discovery, and prevention easier. SCADA stakeholders,
developers, and vulnerability analysts all can beneﬁt from this taxonomy. Through the
development of the taxonomy, and the analysis of case studies that lead up to it, recommendations were identiﬁed that can be made to ensure he future development of more
secure HMI products. Primarily, it was identiﬁed that the body of design principles by
Saltzer & Schroeder should be integrated into secure coding education for SCADA HMI
developers in order to prevent the common design ﬂaws found in case studies presented in
this work. Finally, future work has been identiﬁed that will help in promoting secure development practices for these products and assist in repairing vulnerabilities that currently
exist and remain to be discovered.
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6.1.1

Contributions

The primary contribution of this work is the development of a taxonomy for SCADA
HMI vulnerabilities, based on characteristics observed in case studies performed in this
dissertation research. The taxonomy illustrates a set of categories which assists SCADA
stakeholders in focusing efforts on addressing vulnerabilities and monitoring, ultimately
improving the security of national critical infrastructure. For vulnerability analysts (experienced and new), and SCADA HMI developers, a set vulnerabilities were shown to exist
that could serve as excellent teaching tools to ﬁnd and avoid similar vulnerabilities in the
future. This will lead to less hard-to-mitigate vulnerabilities for stakeholders in the future.
In the research for this dissertation, new vulnerabilities were discovered in a number
of different HMI packages. Each vulnerability was identiﬁed and analyzed, and proof of
concept code developed to illustrate exploitability. Vulnerabilities were reported to the
vendors via US-CERT and ICS-CERT, published, and presented at industry conferences
in order to present control system vulnerability information to a wider audience, including
stakeholders that run vulnerable HMI software in their own organizations. Through this
work, awareness has been raised in academia and industry about vulnerabilities in this type
of system, which may, over time, result in more secure code and deployments of SCADA
HMI systems.
This research has also resulted in the documentation of processes that can be used to
identify and exploit vulnerabilities in HMI software. This information is useful for vulnerability analysts that are tasked with identifying new vulnerabilities to ﬁx. In this way,
this research branches out to ﬁnd and remedy far more vulnerabilities than were possible
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in the scope of this research alone. Vulnerability information can be used by penetration
testing and “red team” groups to test the deployment of speciﬁc SCADA systems in order
to determine if patches and mitigation methods have been applied, and that secure conﬁgurations are in use. The vulnerability data in this research has been used successfully in the
classroom with undergraduate and graduate computer science students in an information
security course in modules about SCADA software and introductory vulnerability analysis.
The vulnerabilities found in HMI software served as excellent examples, due to the ease of
exploitation and application to real-world critical infrastructure security.
HMI developers can use the information in this dissertation to begin the process of developing more secure code, in the form of patches for current HMI systems, and the future
secure development of new HMI software and added features on existing packages. The
technical information found in the case studies provided in this dissertation are adequate to
identify areas that should be focused on in ﬁnding vulnerabilities in source code of existing HMI products that developers are currently maintaining. While more work should be
done on educating HMI vendors on secure programming and design practices, the existing
published work should begin to assist developers that seek it out.

6.1.2

Publications

Research proposed this dissertation has already been published by the author in the
Journal of Systems and Software, Volume 82, Issue 4, under the title of Discovering Vulnerabilities in Control System Human-Machine Interface Software. This publication describes a representative case-study of vulnerabilities found in an HMI system that illustrate
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architectural ﬂaws that could prove to be common across many HMI products [27]. An
invited article to The CIP Report (Volume 7, Number 8) has been published on the same
topic, under the title “Vulnerability Analysis of SCADA HMI Systems” [28]. The vulnerabilities discussed in these two publications were responsibly disclosed to the vendor
and the US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), where it was assigned the
vulnerability identiﬁer VU#310355 [41]. Talks on this subject have been given at conferences, such as the Systems and Software Technology Conference and the SANS SCADA
Summit, as well.
Information discovered by the author on vulnerabilities in Genesis 32, KingView HMI,
and Inﬁlink HMI, was published in the proceedings of DEFCON 20 and presenting in
July of 2012. DEFCON 20 is the largest (with attendance estimated between 10,0000 and
15,000) and highest proﬁle security conference each year. The talk was presented in the
“Track One” of the conference, in the largest lecture hall, to a large audience including vulnerability analysts, penetration testers, SCADA stakeholders, and members of the media
(hundreds more watched the talk later on the Internet). A more personal question-andanswer session immediately followed, with a number of SCADA stakeholders and media
in attendance. A workshop on discovering and analyzing HMI vulnerabilities was also presented at the local regional security conference, BSides Jackson, in Jackson Mississippi, in
November of 2012. The results of taxonomy development are currently being put into an
article to be submitted by the end of April for journal publication.
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6.2

Future Work
Future work will be performed to make improvements upon the taxonomy created in

this work. Guidelines for categorizing vulnerabilities should be further developed, and
ongoing work is needed in categorizing new SCADA HMI vulnerabilities as they are discovered. By applying the characterizations through the life-cycle of new vulnerabilities
as they are discovered, the changes in category over time for vulnerabilities can be observed and documented. User studies should be conducted to determine the impact of the
vulnerability on the operations of elements of national critical infrastructure.
Further investigation into ﬁnding previously undiscovered HMI vulnerabilities should
take place. This investigation should continue to look for design ﬂaws as well as programming error vulnerabilities (such as memory corruption ﬂaws). Vulnerabilities that are
the result of programmer error are frequently reported in SCADA software by researchers
who have a background in discovering similar vulnerabilities in mainstream IT software.
It has been demonstrated here that, alongside the same vulnerabilities found in mainstream
IT software, there are design ﬂaws that are common across multiple SCADA HMI software products, such as similar password disclosure vulnerabilities found in three different
products. Further work in discovering more design ﬂaws that violate the same principles,
and other basic principles of secure software design, would further validate and extend the
taxonomy presented in this work.
The vulnerability discovered in Iconics Genesis 32 was the result of a feature designed
to allow access in emergency situations. More so than in mainstream IT software, SCADA
and control systems software frequently automates physical processes that are either re110

sponsible for public health and safety or could endanger the safety of humans, either nearby
(nuclear reactors, for example) or the beneﬁciaries of the service provided (water treatment,
for example). In such safety-critical situations, there is a need to always have the ability
to shut down the process or change parameters in the event of a catastrophic failure. This
requires a user with appropriate credentials to always be on hand (along with as many
backup users as necessary to ensure the appropriate level of safety), or, more realistically,
a way for the users that are on-hand to intervene in the event of an emergency, regardless
of their usual access level.
There is a need to develop a means for allowing access to critical software in emergency
situations for those who would not normally need such access. This may involve a secure
means of a remote authority (a vendor, a solutions provider, or a set of trusted users oncall) digitally signing orders to raise privileges. In cases where this is determined to be too
much of a burden, there should be a mechanism for logging emergency access in a way that
is impossible to modify or delete for the user that initiated the access. Such a mechanism
has the potential to fully compromise the security of a system, if an outside attacker gained
access to a user-level account with the capability of increasing privilege at-will, and this
would likely be the biggest challenge associated with researching and developing such a
mechanism.
While this document is meant to serve as a resource for SCADA HMI developers and
vulnerability analysts examining SCADA HMI systems, there is a need for further education and training. Course-ware that focuses on the application of the principles of secure
software development as it speciﬁcally relates to control systems security would be useful
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to developers of HMI software. Specialized classes that take a technical look at the details
of control systems software vulnerabilities and the steps taken to identify and exploit them
would be useful to security researchers and penetration testers that are tasked with testing
the security of such systems, and would give them an opportunity to devote time and effort
to match that of persistent attackers.
Speciﬁcally, there should be further investigation into the tendency of vendors to respond to password disclosure vulnerabilities appropriately. In all three cases where it
was determined that passwords were not hashed securely, and were reversible from their
encoded state, the vendors of the software were not able to repair the issue. One vendor chose to not change the mechanism, and the two vendors that issued patches simply
changed the mechanism to a more complex, yet still reversible function. In both cases the
new functionality seemed to act more towards increasing the obfuscation beyond a simple
exclusive-or or inversion, rather than solving the essence of the problem (and following
the proper security principles). It is ironic in both cases that it likely took far longer to
develop a more complex encoding scheme than it would have taken to simply generate
or derive a salt value, concatenate it to the given password, and pass the result through
an industry-standard hashing function that the developers would not even have to design
(such as MD5 or SHA1). This is certainly an issue of education, and could be focused on
in a classroom environment, or a more widespread awareness program targeting control
systems developers.
Due to the higher stakes involved in securing control systems, an investigation should
take place into the impact of denial-of-service attacks on the safety of control systems.
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While there have been dramatic examples of attacks that result in physical destruction of
equipment[6], and documentation exists on the results of the Stuxnet[39] malware, a more
extensive study should be conducted on the effects of denial of service attacks that exist
in SCADA software to measure their impact on short and long-term operations. A similar
study could also examine the impact on control systems of denial-of-service vulnerabilities
determined to be low-impact in mainstream IT software, where those vulnerabilities also
exist in control systems deployments (in software such as operating systems and other
support or server software).
While modern operating systems that provide multi-user, multi-tasking capability, such
as Microsoft Windows, offer features of memory protection and authentication that SCADA
HMI software can leverage to improve security, it could also be said that the status of Windows as a general purpose operating system allows for more functionality than is absolutely
necessary for HMI software to operate. As an example, with the ability to launch a web
browser, comes the temptation for users to switch out of the HMI interface to browse the
public Internet. An operating system with all of the capabilities needed to support HMI
software, as well as the ability to assist in locking down the interface to only the HMI, with
no additional functionality adding to the attack surface, would be useful in some situations.
In some situations, the unacceptability of down-time, hardware compatibility, or other
circumstances might delay or prohibit the installation of patches or new software systems
that repair vulnerabilities such as those pointed out in this document. In cases where requirements or cost make the deployment of newer, more secure systems difﬁcult, a wrapper
that would allow security features to be layered on top of the insecure HMI packages would
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be useful. Such a wrapper would encapsulate or virtualize the software, while implementing access control, monitoring, and other security measures. Challenges would include
testing the security of the wrapper, and determining how to implement varying levels of
access to different users.
An effort should be made to determine forensic artifacts of attacks on control systems,
including HMI. Vulnerabilities described in this work, as well as future vulnerabilities
could be tested in a controlled environment to determine their impact on memory and disk
images of the systems targeted. Using this data, indicators of compromise and evidence
items could be determined that would reveal the presence, methods, tools, and potential
identifying information about attackers.
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APPENDIX A
SOURCE CODE
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A.1

Genesis 32 Response Calculator Source

#!/usr/bin/python
# gen32_challenge_response.py
# Uses this library: http://www.oocities.org/rozmanov/python/md4.html
import md4
import binascii
import sys
md4_context = md4.new()
md4_context.update(sys.argv[1])
print binascii.hexlify(md4_context.digest())[:8]

A.2

KEP Inﬁlink HMI Userﬁle Decoder Source

#!/usr/bin/python
# decode Infilink passwords
import sys
def decode_password(enc):
dec = ’’
i=0
for c in enc:
dec += chr(ord(c)ˆ(0x30+i))
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i += 1
return dec
fp = open(sys.argv[1],’rb’)
data = fp.read()
fp.close()
while True:
index = data.find(’\x20\x03\x00\x00\x01\x00’)+6
if index == 5:
break
username_length = ord(data[index])
index += 5
username = data[index:index+username_length*2]
print ’Username: %s’ % (username)
index += username_length*2
description_length = ord(data[index])
if description_length == 0:
index+=4
else:
index+=5
description = data[index:index+description_length*2]
print ’Description: %s’ % (description)
index += description_length*2
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user_level = ord(data[index])
print ’Userlevel: %i’ % (user_level)
index += 12
password_length = ord(data[index])
index += 4
password = data[index:index+password_length]
print ’Password: %s\n’ % (decode_password(password))
index += password_length
data = data[index:]

A.3

WellinTech KingView User File Decoder Source

#!/usr/bin/python
import sys
fp = open(sys.argv[1],’rb’)
data = fp.read()
fp.close()
decoded = ’’
for c in data:
decoded += ’%c’%(chr(255-ord(c)))
print decoded
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